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ABSTRACT 
Chinese cadre responsibility systems are a core element of 
Chinese law and governance.  These top-down personnel systems 
set concrete target goals linked to official salaries and career 
advancement.  Judges and courts face annual targets for 
permissible numbers of mediated, reversed, and closed cases; 
Communist Party secretaries and government bureaus face similar 
targets for allowable numbers of protests, traffic accidents, and 
mine disasters.  For many local Chinese officials, these targets have 
a much more direct impact on their behavior than do formal legal 
and regulatory norms. 
This Article argues that Chinese authorities are dependent on 
responsibility systems, particularly their use of strict, vicarious, 
and collective liability principles, as an institutional tool to address 
pervasive principal-agent problems they face in governing a large 
authoritarian bureaucracy.  But excessive reliance on these 
methods to control local officials ironically fuels governance 
problems that Chinese central leaders seek to address.  Central 
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Chinese authorities do not want township officials colluding to 
falsify tax records or engaging in ill-conceived development 
projects that waste central funds.  Nor do they want rural residents 
burning down government buildings or staging mass petitions to 
Beijing to protest the actions of local officials.  But these are the 
direct results of cadre evaluation systems that Chinese authorities 
use to govern their local agents. 
Continued reliance on responsibility systems as a tool of 
governance raises significant conflicts with the legal reforms that 
Chinese authorities have pursued since 1978.  And recent 
developments suggest that central Chinese authorities may be 
backing away from their efforts to govern China, and their local 
agents, through law and legal institutions.  At least some leaders 
appear to favor an alternative strategy—strengthening the role of 
responsibility systems as a tool for monitoring local agents.  This is 
a fundamental conflict over the core question of how to govern 
China.  How it is resolved will have lasting implications for 
China’s domestic evolution and stability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Their tactics were brutal and rapacious.  In May 2007, local 
officials in the southwestern Chinese province of Guangxi 
descended on Bobai county in a campaign aimed at enforcing 
China’s population laws and meeting target goals for allowable 
numbers of births in their jurisdiction.  They forced pregnant 
women to have abortions.  They demolished homes to make 
residents cough up fines demanded for excess children.  Citizen 
anger boiled over into rioting.  Thousands of angry rural residents 
took to the streets, sacking government offices in protest.1 
The vicious nature of the local Guangxi enforcement campaign 
was all the more striking because it directly conflicted with the 
explicit orders of China’s top leaders.  Just months before, in 
January 2007, Central Communist Party (“Party”) and government 
officials had issued a joint directive ordering stronger enforcement 
of China’s population planning laws—precisely the aim of 
Guangxi authorities.  However, the national directive clearly 
limited the measures to be used.  It banned forced abortions, 
emphasized financial aid to reward compliance with birth control 
policies, and downplayed the use of coercive measures to punish 
noncompliance.2  Indeed, the director of China’s national family 
planning council even suggested that national authorities would 
waive fines entirely for poor Chinese citizens.3 
What explains such a striking disconnect between the central 
aims and the local realities?  Conflicting norms governing official 
behavior are a key factor.  Local cadre responsibility systems 
employed to evaluate the performance of Party and government 
officials do not necessarily correspond with central laws and 
policies.  In April, 2007, Bobai county Party and government 
officials issued an implementation plan for the national population 
planning efforts.  The plan designated hard enforcement targets.  
 
1 This paragraph, as well as some of the material in the following two, is 
adapted from a prior-op-ed by the author.  See Carl Minzner, Op-Ed., Corruption 
in China: The Anger Boils Over, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/opinion/29iht-edminzer.1.5912729.html. 
2 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu quanmian jiaqiang renkou he 
jihua shengyu gongzuo tongchou jiejue renkou wenti de jueding [Communist 
Central Party Committee and State Council Decision on Comprehensively 
Strengthening Population Planning Work], issued Jan. 22, 2007 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www1.www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/content_534194. htm. 
3 Maureen Fan, China May Lower Fines for Poor Who Violate One-Child-Only 
Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2007, at A7. 
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For example, it required each Party, government, or state-owned 
enterprise employee to successfully raise 500 yuan in “social 
compensation” fees from residents who had borne children in 
excess of population planning laws, and to get one local resident to 
undergo a tubal ligation or “other remedial measure” by the end of 
August.  Failure of individual state employees to make target 
resulted in loss of their annual salary bonus and forfeiture of any 
possibility for career promotion or honors that year.  Failure of 
township governments to reach their collective targets resulted in 
all township employees receiving similar penalties for up to two 
years.4 
Bobai county authorities were not ignorant of the central 
authorities’ instructions.  Their plan was aimed at implementing it.  
Indeed, their plan specifically called for the January directive to be 
printed in booklet form and distributed to local cadres and farmers 
as part of an education campaign to accompany enforcement 
efforts.5  But township officials were placed in an untenable 
situation.  Sure, the central directive set out broad behavioral 
norms, but the county plan set clear, hard targets directly linked to 
their salaries and careers.  In such a situation, violating national 
rules (and laws) to aggressively fulfill specific work targets was 
simply rational economic behavior. 
Conflict between national law or central directives and local 
cadre evaluation systems occurs in numerous areas of Chinese law 
and governance.  China has enacted extensive environmental laws 
and regulations, but Party personnel evaluations of local officials 
used to determine their career advancement and promotion have 
traditionally placed heavy emphasis on economic growth statistics.  
This incentivizes some local officials to violate relevant laws, falsify 
GDP statistics to superiors, and blindly engage in development 
 
4 It also specified enforcement timetables, detailed county-level Party cadres 
to assist township authorities with enforcement, and detached a vice-president of 
the local court to head a special unit for the rapid trials of residents who resisted.  
See Li Yijin & Liu Yadong, Bobai County Government website, Bobai yi wushi de 
zuofeng dada renkou jihua shengyu gongzuo fanshezhang [Through Pragmatism in 
Attacking the Problem of Population Planning, Bobai [County] Will Bring About A 
Turnaround], BOXUN.COM, Apr. 30, 2007, http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china 
/2007/05/200705210347.shtml (describing the Bobai county plan to implement 
population planning policy after receiving a “yellow card” from Guangxi 
Autonomous Region authorities for their failure to achieve policy targets). 
5 Id. 
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projects in an effort to reach their annual targets.6  National 
regulations bar local authorities from retaliating against citizen 
petitioners who seek to bring complaints before higher authorities.7  
However, Party cadre evaluation systems heavily stress social 
order statistics.  These sanction local Party secretaries based on the 
number of citizen petitioners who leave the jurisdiction to present 
grievances to higher-level officials.  This leads local officials to 
resort to repressive tactics (including illegal detentions) to prevent 
petitioners from reaching higher officials and thereby negatively 
affecting the career prospects of local officials.8 
These examples reflect an alternative incentive structure 
created by the target responsibility systems (zeren zhuijiu zhi, 
mubiao guanli zeren zhi) that are the core of the Chinese Party and 
government cadre evaluation process.  These personnel systems set 
concrete target goals linked to officials’ salaries and career 
advancement.  They apply sanctions and rewards based on strict, 
collective, and vicarious liability for the failure (or success) of 
officials and their units in attaining designated targets.  As Chinese 
scholars have noted, this creates a “pressurized” environment in 
which making target (or appearing to do so) is all-important.9  For 
many ordinary local Chinese officials, these targets have a much 
 
6 Pan Yue: Yao queli lüse GDP zai zhengji kaohe zhong de hexin diwei [Pan Yue: 
The Core Role of Green GDP Must be Established in Officials’ Evaluation Process], 
BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/newscenter/2005-03/01/content_2631570.htm. 
7 Xinfang tiaoli [Xinfang Regulations] (promulgated by State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, Jan. 10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) 2005 ST. COUNCIL 
GAZ, art. 3 (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.gjxfj.gov.cn/2006-03/07 
/content_6399309.htm. 
8 Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 
STAN. J. INT’L. L. 103 (2006).  Local taxation provides another example.  Some 
county-level authorities impose hard tax revenue targets that township officials 
are expected to generate.  Failure results in deductions from annual bonuses, or 
negative notations in official career files.  Success results in retention of the excess 
funds generated.  In relatively poorer regions of central and western China, this 
fuels a range of illegal behavior and corruption as local officials strike backroom 
deals with companies outside the local jurisdiction to falsely report taxes within 
the jurisdiction in return for a discount (or kickback) on the taxes paid.  See, e.g., 
Zhongxi bu chuxian xiangzhen mai shui bao zhi zhengji xianxiang [Central and 
Western China Experience Township Officials ‘Buying Tax Receipts’ in Order to 
Cook up Official Evaluation Results], Politics.People.com, Sept. 21, 2006, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/4840559.html. 
9 Tony Saich, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analyzing the Local State in China, 
in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM 75, 94 (Luigi Tomba ed., 2002). 
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more direct impact on their behavior than abstract legal and 
regulatory norms. 
The existence of two separate sets of normative rules governing 
official behavior—legal norms enacted by state institutions and 
Party-managed cadre responsibility systems—means that the 
possibility for conflict is always latent.  In some instances, this 
simply leads to the emergence of quiet divergences and systematic 
inconsistencies, as local officials respond to the more direct 
personnel incentives created by responsibility systems that poorly 
reflect the purported aims of national law.  In other cases, this 
tension erupts into spectacular violations of legal norms that 
central authorities have publicly promulgated. 
Given the critical nature of cadre responsibility systems—
officially promulgated instructions to local Party and government 
authorities as to what their responsibilities are, and what 
punishments or rewards will result from failure or compliance—it 
is surprising how sparsely they are analyzed in the existing 
literature.  Political scientists have begun to explore cadre 
responsibility systems as a subject in the last few years.10  But 
almost no literature exists examining the interaction of 
responsibility systems with the Chinese legal system.  Legal 
academic literature has extensively studied formal legal norms 
promulgated by central institutions such as the Supreme People’s 
Court (“SPC”) and National People’s Congress (“NPC”), but 
responsibility systems have been ignored.  As one prominent 
American scholar of Chinese law has noted, local court 
responsibility systems and the incentives they create for Chinese 
judges are “terra incognita in terms of published systematic 
studies.”11 
All significant studies of Chinese law, of course, do remark on 
the core role of the Chinese Communist Party.12  However, they 
 
10 See Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre 
Management from a Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35, 38–40 (2003) (analyzing 
the operations of Party cadre responsibility systems); Susan H. Whiting, The Cadre 
Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule, in HOLDING CHINA 
TOGETHER 101, 112–15 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004) (arguing that 
cadre responsibility systems are linked to dysfunctional policy implementation). 
11 Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in 
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164, 
178 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). 
12 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 
211–223, 302–09 (2002); STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN 
CHINA AFTER MAO 253–58, 263–67 (1999) (discussing how the Party remains 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/2
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tend to depict the Party as an external force intervening in legal 
institutions and processes—ordering the arrest and convictions of 
dissidents, controlling the nominations of top judges, and 
supervising the operations of the procuratorate and courts through 
Party political-legal committees.  Few have focused on the internal 
role of Party committees and organization bureaus in setting 
performance targets that incentivize particular behavior of local 
officials through the use of salary and career rewards. 
Furthermore, prior literature has not fully examined core 
questions regarding the reasons underlying the use of responsibility 
systems.13  What institutional role do these systems fill, particularly 
their reliance on strict, vicarious, and collective liability principles?  
Why do Chinese authorities rely on these systems when they create 
problematic behavioral incentives for local officials that compete, 
conflict, and sometimes completely violate norms that central 
authorities have promulgated? 
China’s authoritarian political system and a lack of 
commitment to legal norms that might curtail state power are part 
of the picture, but they do not fully explain it.  The strict, vicarious, 
and collective liability regimes embodied in cadre responsibility 
systems create perverse incentives for local officials to violate not 
only central legal norms, but also central Party ones.  This 
generates significant practical problems for central authorities.  
Incentives established under local responsibility systems press 
local officials to engage in abuses of power that national authorities 
would very much like to stamp out.  Central Chinese authorities 
do not want local township officials colluding to falsify tax records 
or engaging in ill-conceived development projects that waste 
central funds.  Nor do they want rural residents burning down 
local government buildings.  Nonetheless, these are direct results 
of the cadre evaluation systems that Chinese authorities use to 
govern their local agents.  So, why? 
 
embedded in Chinese legal institutions and how it influences the appointment 
and removal of Chinese judges); JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949–1963: AN INTRODUCTION 5–18, 71–96, 131–141 
(1968). 
13 Neither comprehensive studies of Chinese governance that stress the 
declining institutional capabilities of the Party center to monitor local officials, nor 
those that emphasize the institutional resilience of central authorities in 
addressing these problems, analyze these systems.  See, e.g., DAVID SHAMBAUGH, 
CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION 128–60 (2008); MINXIN PEI, 
CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 144–66 
(2006). 
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This Article fills this void.  It is divided into three main parts. 
Part 2 outlines the nature and history of Chinese responsibility 
systems.  It also identifies their key shared characteristics:  Party-
managed personnel systems, based on principles of strict, 
collective, and vicarious liability, linking the career advancement 
and salaries of officials to their success or failure in meeting 
designated goals. 
Part 2 also identifies the institutional role that responsibility 
systems play in Chinese law and governance.  They are critical 
governance mechanisms for Chinese leaders to steer and manage a 
massive bureaucracy.  In particular, the widespread application of 
strict, vicarious, and collective liability through the bureaucratic 
personnel system is a top-down response by authoritarian Chinese 
central rulers (imperial and Party alike) who are seeking to address 
severe principal-agent problems and informational gaps in 
monitoring their local officials, but who remain very 
uncomfortable with allowing the emergence of independent, 
bottom-up institutional channels to respond to these problems. 
Part 3 examines the negative side effects produced by central 
Chinese reliance on responsibility systems to govern—particularly 
their excessive reliance on strict, vicarious, and collective liability.  
This strategy creates incentives that fuel a range of abuses by local 
officials, including cover-ups, corruption, and distorted policy 
implementation.  Ironically, Chinese leaders’ existing strategy for 
addressing the principal-agent problem at the heart of the Chinese 
bureaucracy is itself a significant source and cause of the 
governance problems they are seeking to address. 
Part 4 suggests how our understanding of the Chinese legal 
system may need to change in light of this Article’s analysis.  It 
calls for the study of Chinese law to expand beyond formal law 
and recognize the functional role that internal Party regulations 
play within the bureaucratic system.  Explicitly examining them 
may be essential to understanding (or altering) the actual incentive 
structures that affect the behavior of Chinese officials. 
Finally, this Part raises important questions regarding the 
future evolution of the Chinese legal and political system.  The 
governance strategy embodied in responsibility systems exists in 
uneasy tension with formal legal norms promulgated by the 
Chinese state in the post-1978 reform period.  It conflicts with an 
alternative conception of “law” supported by Chinese legal 
reformers, a view that sees law as outside of, and perhaps an 
alternative to, the top-down bureaucratic personnel control 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/2
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mechanisms on which Chinese authorities have traditionally relied 
to govern. 
Recent developments, however, suggest that central Chinese 
authorities may be backing away from their decades-long effort to 
govern China and their local agents, through law and legal 
institutions.  At least some leaders appear to favor an alternative 
strategy—strengthening the role of responsibility systems as a tool 
for monitoring their local agents.  This is a fundamental conflict 
over the core issue of how to govern the world’s largest nation.  
How it is resolved will have lasting implications for China’s 
domestic evolution and stability. 
2. RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS 
2.1. Background. 
Modern Chinese responsibility systems are not new.  They are 
lineal descendants of governance practices employed by 
generations of imperial and Party authorities to administer a 
sprawling authoritarian bureaucracy. 
One of the world’s earliest bureaucratic systems, the imperial 
Chinese state endured under different dynastic successors (with 
some interruptions) from 221 BCE to 1911 CE.  A concentration of 
formal power characterized imperial governance.  At the top, 
ultimate authority rested in the hands of the emperor.  At the 
bottom, the imperial Chinese state fused all political and judicial 
authority in the hands of district magistrates, each responsible for 
the affairs of an individual county.14  In order to effectively manage 
their local agents, central authorities relied on an extensive system 
of regular personnel evaluation and review.  Magistrates with 
superior performance received promotions, those with poor 
performance suffered censure and fines.15 
Central imperial authorities faced a classic principal-agent 
problem in managing the bureaucracy.  The concentration of 
power in the hands of individual magistrates, combined with their 
control over channels of information and reporting to higher 
 
14 DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 4–5, 114 (1967); 
JOHN R. WATT, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 11–21 (1972). 
15 T’UNG-TSU CH’Ü, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH’ING 32–33 
(1962) (describing the system of promotions and disciplinary measures for 
magistrates); WEI QINGYUAN, ZHONGGUO GUANZHI SHI [HISTORY OF THE CHINESE 
BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM] 382–99 (2001). 
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authorities, generated real problems in evaluating local officials.  
How was the center to assess the accuracy of magistrate reports 
regarding local governance?  Was the local magistrate telling the 
truth that the decline in annual tax revenue from his county was 
the result of external factors, or was he simply covering up his own 
corruption or incompetence?16 
Chinese emperors adopted a range of strategies in response.  
Increased direct top-down supervision was one method they 
employed.  Emperors attempted to open alternative channels of 
information to evaluate magistrates’ performance—channels that 
did not depend on (potentially distorted) self-reporting by 
magistrates themselves.  Perhaps the best-known example of these 
efforts was the imperial censorate.  Chinese emperors established a 
group of high-level authorities (censors) and endowed them with 
wide-ranging powers to investigate governance problems 
throughout the country.  Emperors attempted to use the censorate 
to carry out an end-run around information blockages at lower 
levels of the Chinese bureaucracy, authorizing censors to bypass 
ordinary reporting channels and provide recommendations and 
reports directly to the throne.17   
However, such efforts at direct supervision faced fundamental 
constraints.  Censors were few in number.  No guarantee existed 
that their reports were entirely free from bias or self-serving 
political ingratiation.  Most importantly, the nature of the censorate 
as a tool for the emperor’s personal supervision of the bureaucracy 
imposed inherent limits.  Censors could serve as a myriad of “eyes 
and ears” to funnel a mass of information directly to the emperor, 
but they were not permitted to usurp his ultimate power of 
decision.18  This dependence on a single individual (or “brain”) to 
take action on a mass of censorial reports (from the “eyes and 
ears”) meant that the utility of such direct supervision mechanisms 
depended on the available time and energy of the reigning 
emperor.  Faced with an overworked or incompetent emperor, or 
one who preferred to spend time with the imperial concubines 
 
16 THOMAS A. METZGER, THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CH’ING 
BUREAUCRACY: LEGAL, NORMATIVE, AND COMMUNICATION ASPECTS 289–91 (1973). 
17 Lawrence J.R. Herson, China’s Imperial Bureaucracy: Its Direction and Control, 
17 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 44, 48 (1957). 
18 Id.; Jonathan K. Ocko, I’ll Take it All the Way to Beijing: Capital Appeals in the 
Qing, 47 J. ASIAN STUD. 291, 296 (1988). 
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rather than managing matters of state, unread censorial reports 
simply piled up, and the system lost effectiveness. 
Confronted with the inherent limitations of direct top-down 
oversight, the imperial Chinese system developed other 
mechanisms to help monitor magistrates.  Strict liability was one 
alternative.  Magistrates received automatic sanctions for a range 
of specified failings, such as failing to meet designated quotas for 
tax revenue from their jurisdictions.19  Imperial administrative 
regulations and the criminal code imposed corporal punishments 
for any magistrate whose judicial decision was reversed on appeal, 
regardless of the reason.20  Strict liability reduced the need for 
higher-level authorities to inquire into the reasons behind every 
particular governance failure.  Strict liability also introduced strong 
incentives for magistrates to exert themselves to avoid reversal or 
other specified outcomes leading to sanctions. 
The imperial Chinese system also responded to principal-agent 
monitoring problems by widely employing collective and vicarious 
liability.  This allowed central authorities to partially offload 
monitoring responsibilities by creating strong incentives for lower-
level authorities to watch each other.  The Ming Code, for example, 
applied collective criminal liability to the colleagues and 
supervisors of magistrates and other officials who committed 
inadvertent errors (not just intentional crimes) in the course of their 
public duties.21  Imperial regulations held magistrates personally 
responsible for the infractions of their subordinate clerks or 
runners, such as embezzlement or abuse of authority.22  
Magistrates used similar principles to govern their subordinates.23  
In one late-19th-century Sichuan example, two local police 
constables took a detainee to a local opium den, proceeded to 
smoke themselves into a stupor, and permitted the prisoner to 
escape.  In addition to ordering the beating of the two constables 
involved, the local magistrate also decreed that all head runners in 
 
19 See CH’Ü, supra note 15, at 32-33 (describing the system for promotion and 
punishment of magistrates); WATT, supra note 14, at 18-19 (describing the 
disciplinary regulations imposed on officials). 
20 Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The 
Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives on, 39 N.M. L. REV. 63 (2009). 
21 THE GREAT MING CODE lxviii (Jiang Yonglin trans., 2005). 
22 CH’Ü, supra note 15, at 70–73. 
23 BRADLY W. REED, TALONS AND TEETH: COUNTY CLERKS AND RUNNERS IN THE 
QING DYNASTY 126-27 (2000). 
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the division would face penal confinement if the escaped prisoner 
was not recaptured within fifteen days.24 
The collapse of imperial dynastic rule in 1911 did not spell the 
end of the Chinese bureaucratic state.  Both Nationalist (post-1927) 
and Communist (post-1949) authorities re-established extensive 
authoritarian bureaucracies after seizing power.  Regularized top-
down personnel control was a key element of their rule.25  To 
ensure the loyalty of its cadres, Communist personnel systems 
implemented during the 1950s required regular assessments of the 
local officials’ political attitudes.  These assessments were entered 
into individuals’ permanent personnel dossiers, and used for 
deciding promotions (and demotions) throughout the 
bureaucracy.26 
Party authorities also experimented with making defined work 
targets a component of local officials’ performance evaluations.  In 
the early 1950s, Chinese authorities imported industrial 
management methods from the Soviet Union as part of 
establishing a state-run economy.  In particular, Chinese officials 
borrowed the concepts of “responsibility systems” and “one-man 
management.”  These top-down systems set production targets for 
individual factories, and held factory managers personally 
responsible for ensuring that their work units made target.  Success 
resulted in rewards; failure in sanctions.  Factory managers 
received sweeping decision-making authority regarding how to 
make these targets, with broad powers to set quotas and 
compensation standards for subordinates as a means to push them 
to realize work unit goals.27 
Such top-down management systems were marginalized as 
tools of Chinese bureaucratic supervision, however, during the two 
 
24 Id. 
25 PATRICIA M. THORNTON, DISCIPLINING THE STATE: VIRTUE, VIOLENCE, AND 
STATE-MAKING IN MODERN CHINA, 81–83, 141–44 (2007).  Top-down personnel 
control included strategies of mandatory self-reporting by local officials, as well as 
the use of top-down inspections by higher-level work teams that paralleled 
imperial censorate practices.  See JEAN C. OI, STATE AND PEASANT IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENT, 84–103 (1989).  In the 
face of such management techniques, local officials countered with a range of 
strategies for evading and concealing negative information.  Id., at 104–130. 
26 A. DOAK BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
COMMUNIST CHINA, 166–68 (1967). 
27 See generally FRANZ SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN 
COMMUNIST CHINA, 242–62 (2d ed. 1968) (describing top-down Chinese 
management systems). 
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decades of political radicalism that began in the late 1950s.  
Partially as a result of their decades-long experience leading a 
revolutionary movement, Party leaders such as Mao Zedong 
distrusted bureaucracy.  They feared it would lead inexorably to 
the distancing of officials from the people, and the dimming of 
revolutionary ardor among the masses.  Party authorities 
consequently relied on frequent (and chaotic) rectification 
campaigns involving highly politicized bottom-up mass 
participation as a preferred governance tool to supervise the 
bureaucracy.28  Campaigns involved mass rallies, public 
denunciations, and mandatory self-criticism by accused officials.  
The aims of these campaigns were to expose the work errors of 
local officials (and of citizens themselves) and to ferret out 
disloyalty and incompetence.29  Political campaigns led to regular 
upheavals in the bureaucracy, and were a prime factor in the 
highly unstable political climate that marked China from the late 
1950s until the mid-1970s.30  The prevailing anti-bureaucratic 
emphasis of this period also led to a rollback of experiments with 
top-down target-based responsibility systems in the economic 
sphere.  State-owned factory managers were instead expected to 
maintain close contact with the workers, accept bottom-up 
supervision and suggestions, and lead from the factory floor.31 
The onset of the reform period in the 1970s saw a shift back 
toward the official use of incentive-based target systems.  This first 
took place in agriculture.  Dissatisfied with the economic 
stagnation that resulted from Maoist agricultural policies that 
separated actual work from economic rewards,32 central Chinese 
authorities undertook radical reforms.  In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, they authorized local experimentation with “household 
contract responsibility systems” and “production responsibility 
systems.”  These set production quotas for individual households 
or work teams, devolved authority to them to decide exactly how 
 
28 Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy Implementation in Rural 
China, Comparative Politics, 31 COMP. POL. 167, 172 (1999). 
29 HARRY HARDING, ORGANIZING CHINA: THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY, 1948–
1976, 165–77, 277 (1981). 
30 O’Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 172. 
31 SCHURMANN, supra note 27, at 287–93. 
32 Graham E. Johnson, The Production Responsibility System in Chinese 
Agriculture: Some Examples from Guangdong, 55 PAC. AFF. 430, 431–32 (1982).  See 
also Robert F. Ash, The Evolution of Agricultural Policy, 116 CHINA Q. 529, 536–37 
(1988). 
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to meet the targets, and allowed production teams and households 
to collectively reap any excess generated for exceeding the 
targets.33  These reforms established strong production incentives 
for farmers, and fueled China’s massive agricultural and economic 
boom in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Similar changes took place in the political arena.  Traumatized 
by the turbulence of the Maoist era, central Party authorities 
reduced (but did not completely eliminate) the use of political 
campaigns as a tool to manage local officials.  In their place, 
officials turned to a revised cadre evaluation system.  Beginning in 
1979, central Party authorities began to shift cadre evaluation 
systems to emphasize concrete and quantifiable performance 
standards, such as foreign investment generated or GDP growth, 
rather than political-ideological ones.  Whiting notes that this “was 
seen in part as a means to break the paralysis of many cadres 
following the Cultural Revolution and to actively mobilize cadres 
to pursue specific goals set by their superiors.”34  In 1988, central 
Party authorities drafted national guidelines detailing the broad 
categories of work targets to be used to evaluate county-level Party 
secretaries and government leaders.  These provided that results of 
the evaluations should be linked to career rewards and penalties.  
They also encouraged competition between cadres based on their 
success in fulfilling targets.35 
These reforms rippled down through the Chinese bureaucracy.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, legal institutions (such as local 
courts and procuratorates) and administrative organs (such as 
birth control agencies) adopted responsibility systems based on 
work targets.  As with their Party counterparts, these systems 
aimed at strengthening top-down supervision of lower-level 
officials and establishing positive incentives for good work.36 
 
33 Johnson, supra note 32, at 436–39. 
34 Whiting, supra note 10, at 104.  See also, Melanie Manion, The Cadre 
Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of 
Party and State Leaders, 102 CHINA Q. 203, 226–30 (1985) (describing a variety of 
cadre assessment methods); Yasheng Huang, Administrative Monitoring in China, 
143 CHINA Q. 828, 830–31 (1995) (describing systems for monitoring cadres). 
35 Whiting, supra note 10, at 109–10. 
36 MAO HONGJUAN, YINCHUAN LAW ASSN’N, CUO’AN ZEREN ZHUIJIU ZHI CHUTAN 
[PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS FOR INCORRECTLY 
DECIDED CASES] (2006), available at http://www.nxyclawyer.com/llyj/html 
/929.html (discussing the establishment of judicial responsibility systems for 
incorrect decided cases starting in the 1990s and their effects).  See also Di Tianli, 
Woguo xianxing shenpan yunxing jizhi ruogan wenti sikao [Thoughts on Some Problems 
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2.2. Content 
Chinese authorities use cadre responsibility systems (mubiao 
guanli zeren zhi, zeren zhuijiu zhi) to evaluate and discipline Party 
and government officials.  These generally set a range of 
performance targets, often numerical, that are linked to career 
rewards and sanctions.  This Section briefly analyzes how these 
systems operate in Party, administrative, and judicial organs. 
Efforts to make generalizations about Chinese responsibility 
systems encounter difficulties.  First, precise details vary across 
bureaus and regions.  Given a state sector of some 60 million 
employees—more than the entire population of most European 
countries—this can lead to significant differences.37  Second, 
judicial, government, and Party rules establishing responsibility 
systems are not systematically filed or published.  Third, internal 
Party documents governing cadre evaluation policies can be 
sensitive, hampering efforts to systematically collect data.  Fourth, 
Chinese government regulations bar foreign organizations and 
individuals from independently collecting survey data.  
Regulations also bar foreigners from obtaining such data from 
Chinese organizations that have not received government 
authorization to share it.38 
 
with the Operation of China’s Existing Adjudication System], 3 ZHENGFA LUNCONG 
[COMMENTARY ON LAW AND POLITICS] (2002); Zhejiang Provincial Birth Control 
Agency Website, http://jsw.zj.gov.cn/jsw/node10/node27/node77 
/userobject1ai5122.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (noting that population and 
family planning authorities began to establish responsibility systems in the late 
1980s); Jiceng jianchayuan gongzuo lianghua guanli chuyi [Humble Opinions on 
the Management of Work Evaluation of Basic-Level Procuratorates] (promulgated 
by Jingmen City, Dongbao District, Basic-Level Procuratorate, effective April 25, 
2005) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.jingshan.jcy.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp 
?NewsID=477 (discussing the history of work evaluation and management in 
basic-level Procuratorates). 
37 NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, 2007 CHINESE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 
(2007), available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm. 
38 See Shewai diaocha guanli banfa, [Measures on the Management of 
Foreign-Related Surveys], issued Oct. 13, 2004, arts. 9, 10–20, 22 (P.R.C.) available 
at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfg/gzjgfxwj/t20041018_402200576.htm (setting out 
the rules by which foreign scholars and researchers are required to abide in order 
to conduct survey research in China, including locating an approved Chinese 
organization willing to serve as a partner, and submitting the proposed survey 
questions or interview proposals for government approval).  Some foreign 
researchers and organizations do conduct surveys and research in violation of 
these rules.  They risk government suppression.  See Nick Young, Why China 
Cracked Down on My Nonprofit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 4, 2007, at 9; Nick 
Young, Message From the Editor, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com 
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Nonetheless, careful study of publicly available Chinese 
responsibility systems reveals certain shared characteristics.  These 
characteristics are shared across Party, administrative, and judicial 
organs, confirmed by the findings of other scholars who have done 
research on the subject, and correspond with the personal accounts 
of Chinese officials themselves who are subject to them. 
Heimer and Whiting outline the Party responsibility systems 
facing the core political leaders in local Chinese government—
county and township Party secretaries.39  These systems establish 
comprehensive annual targets for a given jurisdiction.  Specific 
targets include:  economic development, tax collection, Party 
building, poverty alleviation, birth control, and social order.  
Targets are assigned point values that leaders receive for meeting 
them.  Vicarious liability applies.  Party leaders of local 
governments that meet their targets (and outperform other 
jurisdictions or leaders) may be personally designated as 
“advanced leaders,” awarded enhanced chances for promotion, or 
receive substantial financial bonuses.40  Control over the evaluation 
process rests with Party organization bureau officials.41 
Targets differ in importance.  Less important targets (such as 
local educational statistics) may be “soft targets” that constitute 
one factor among many used to assess official performance.  In 
contrast, exceptionally important targets may be designated 
“priority targets with veto power” (yipiao fojue).  Failure to attain 
these targets unilaterally cancels out all positive work performance 
in other fields.  The yipiao fojue designation is reserved for a limited 
number of targets identified by higher-level Party authorities as 
critically important. For example, birth control and social order 
 
/node/508 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (discussing a Chinese government 
crackdown on one foreign NGO, specifically banning its founder from returning 
to China for “conducting ‘unauthorized surveys’” in violation of the Statistics 
Law). 
39 Edin, supra note 10, at 38–40; Maria Heimer, The Cadre Responsibility System 
and the Changing Needs of the Party, in THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN REFORM 
122, 129 (Kjeld Brodsgaard & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2006); Whiting, supra note 10. 
40 See Edin, supra note 10, at 39–45 (describing the cadre reward system); see 
also Whiting, supra note 10, at 111 (noting one case in which the financial bonus 
received by a village Party secretary under the local responsibility system 
accounted for 85% of his total income). 
41 See PIERRE F. LANDRY, DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA 135–41 
(2008) (describing the hierarchy of cadre supervision). 
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targets—expressed in terms of permissible numbers of births and 
collective petitions/protests—often receive such designation.42 
Some Party responsibility systems apply strict liability to 
officials and bureaus for failure (or success) in making target.  For 
example, the 2007 Xiaoji township responsibility system specifies 
numerical point deductions (and awards) for a range of negative 
(and positive) outcomes.  Some targets are clearly within the 
control of local officials, such as deductions for their own tardiness 
or for playing cards at work.  Other targets are less clearly within 
their control.  Examples include sanctions for participation rates of 
local farmers in rural health collectives falling below 85%, 
outbreaks of wildfires exceeding fifty mou (8.2 acres), the outbreak 
of collective petitions of local citizens to higher authorities, and the 
(re)occurrence of religious heterodoxy among local residents.43  
Importantly, the system makes no allowance for why the specified 
outcome occurred.  The events might be the direct result of a local 
Party head’s dereliction of duty.  Alternatively, they might take 
place despite her best efforts to prevent them. 
Party responsibility systems often apply collective sanctions.  If 
a given Party or government entity exceeds others in their target 
rankings, the entire unit may be designated as “advanced,” with 
resulting financial and career rewards for the unit and its members 
(in addition to the leader).  Low-rated units receive corresponding 
collective sanctions.44 
Responsibility systems also permeate the Chinese 
administrative state.  Provincial health authorities set 
comprehensive annual targets for hospitals.45  Environmental 
 
42 See Edin, supra note 10, at 38–40 (explaining the importance placed upon 
family planning and social order policies by the Communist Party); Whiting, supra 
note 10, at 112–15; see also Maria Edin, Remaking the Communist Party-State: The 
Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China, 1 CHINA INT’L J. 1, 10 (2003) 
(noting the parallel between priority targets that are enforced nationwide in 
China—family planning and social order (shehui zhi’an)—and the policy priorities 
of the Communist Party). 
43 Zhonggong Xiaoji zhen weiyuanhui, Xiaoji zhen renmin zhengfu guanyu 
2007 nian jiguan ganbu gangwei mubiao kaohe de yijian [Xiaoji Township Party 
Committee and People’s Government Opinion Regarding the 2007 Annual 
Evaluation under the Cadre Target Responsibility System], issued Mar. 28, 2007 
(P.R.C.), available at http://xinxi.haiyang.gov.cn/zhenqu/ArticleShow.asp 
?ArticleID=582.  
44 Edin, supra note 10, at 41, 45. 
45 See Jiangsu sheng weisheng ting zhishu danwei 2005 niandu zonghe 
mubiao guanli zeren zhi kaohe zhibiao [Jiangsu Provincial Health Department 
2005 Comprehensive Target Management Responsibility System and Evaluation 
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authorities set targets for subordinate bureaus and municipal 
governments.46  Transportation officials do so as well.47  For 
example, Hebei provincial transportation authorities rate 
subordinate railroad, port, and road bureaus on a 100-point 
evaluation scale.  Points are deducted based on the number of 
transportation accidents and deaths occurring annually in their 
jurisdiction.  Accidents resulting in 1–2 deaths result in the loss of 
5–10 points; 3–9 deaths result in the loss of 10–20 points.48  Bureaus 
with annual ratings exceeding designated levels receive 
recognition and reward.  Bureaus that fail to meet minimum 
standards suffer reprobation and sanction.49  Accidents causing 
thirty or more deaths, involving children, or creating a “serious 
domestic impact,” are “priority targets with veto power,” and 
cause the relevant bureau to fail automatically.50 
 
Standards for Subordinate Work Units], issued 2005 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.jswst.gov.cn/attachment/jgyy.doc (listing targets and associated 
points awarded to Jiangsu provincial medical personnel and hospitals for meeting 
or failing to meet them) 
46 See Carlos Lo & Shui-yan Tang, Institutional Reform: Economic Changes, and 
Local Environmental Management in China, 15 ENVTL. POL. 189, 202–04 (2006) 
(describing the new responsibility system ordered by the State Council for 
environmental protection, and the way in which it trickled down to provincial 
and municipal governments in the late 1990’s); Dan Guttman & Yaqin Song, 
Making Central-Local Relations Work: Comparing America and China Environmental 
Governance Systems, 1 FRONTIERS OF ENVTL. SCI. & ENG’G IN CHINA 418, 429–30 
(2007) (describing the target system as it interacts with Chinese environmental 
law).  These systems differ in their details and implementation.  Guttman and 
Song note that in the Pudong district of Shanghai, local environmental protection 
bureaus (“EPBs”) each bear responsibility for drafting environmental targets.  The 
Shanghai government subsequently incorporates these standards in their 
evaluations of other municipal agencies, such as transportation authorities.  In 
contrast, Nanjing municipal authorities directly require the head of the local EPB 
to bear responsibility for ensuring that the jurisdiction meets environmental 
standards.  To accomplish this, local EPB authorities enter into target 
responsibility arrangements with polluters, which may include private actors.  Id. 
47 See Hebei sheng jiaotong ting anquan shengchan mubiao guanli kaohe 
banfa [Hebei Provincial Traffic Department Target Safety Production 
Management and Evaluation System], issued Jan. 2006 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Heibei 
System] (setting forth the relevant Hebei responsibility system).  
48 Id. arts. 5(3), 7(1).  In the event of an accidental killing of three to nine 
people, a bureau that has “failed to carry out safe production” duties loses 20 
points, while a bureau “directly in charge of supervising” the location or subject 
involved in the accident loses 10 points.  Id.  
49 Id. arts. 5(4), 6. 
50 Id. arts. 3(1)1, 7(1).  Chinese officials also adopt standalone responsibility 
systems that specify sanctions for particular outcomes, such as the occurrence of 
citizen petitions to higher levels of the bureaucracy.  See, e.g., Jinchang shi xinfang 
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Officials in the state-run media adopt similar systems for print 
and Internet publications.  For example, in 2005, the editors of one 
of China’s leading publications, the China Youth Daily, drafted a 
new internal appraisal system for journalists’ articles.  Journalists 
received points, linked to salary rewards, depending on the results 
of their work.  Authors of the top three most frequently read 
articles in each month’s reader survey each received fifty points.  
Journalists also received points if their articles received official 
praise—100 points if singled out by national government or 
provincial Party authorities, 300 points if singled out by central 
Politburo officials.  Editors received 30% of the points generated by 
the journalists they supervised.  Criticism of journalists by name 
resulted in corresponding losses of points.51  The China Youth 
Daily’s point system received national attention when one of its 
editors publicly distributed a memo that revealed details of the 
appraisal system and criticized it for limiting free speech.  The 
paper’s leaders subsequently announced their intention to 
abandon the appraisal system.52  But similar evaluation systems 
continue to be available on the websites of local Party propaganda 
bureaus.53 
Responsibility systems employed by administrative agencies 
adopt liability principles paralleling those seen in Party systems.  
In systems such as the Hebei one above, the key trigger for 
sanctions is the specified occurrence—death of a specified number 
of people, a particular number of accidents, or the fact that an 
 
gongzuo zeren zhuijiu zhidu [Jinchang Municipal Xinfang Responsibility System], 
issued Nov. 9, 2006 (P.R.C.), available at http://zfb.jc.gansu.gov.cn/showart.asp 
?id=103&showpage=1. 
51 See EastSouthWestNorth, The Letter of Li Datong, 
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050817_2.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) 
(criticizing the appraisal system advanced by Party authorities to establish a 
numerical evaluation system for journalists’ articles, with evaluations linked to a 
series of financial rewards and sanctions). 
52 See Robert Marquand, Chinese Media Resisting Party Control, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Aug. 26, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com 
/2005/0826/p01s04-woap.html (reporting on the widespread practices 
exemplified by the China Youth Daily incident). 
53 See, e.g., Zhonggong Tengzhou shiwei xuanchuanbu guanyu xinwen 
xuanchuan kaohe jiangli de shishi yijian [Opinion of the CCP Tengzhou 
Municipality Propaganda Bureau Regarding Implementation of the News 
Propaganda Evaluation and Reward System], issued Jan. 28, 2008 (P.R.C.), 
available at http://tzwmw.tengzhou.gov.cn/ggl/t20090205_64761.htm (outlining 
the news evaluation and reward system for Tengzhou municipality, including 
rewards for reporting positive news). 
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accident created a “serious domestic impact.”  This is a strict 
liability standard—it is independent of the fault or mental state of 
any of the state employees in question.  Collective and vicarious 
sanctions are employed as well.  In one example from a state-
owned media outlet, all employees in a particular bureau lost their 
annual bonuses (of several thousand yuan apiece) as a result of a 
single employee being detained on prostitution charges that 
“negatively impacted” the bureau’s image.54 
Chinese courts also adopt responsibility systems.55  Targets 
vary under these systems.  Some targets reflect routine 
management concerns.  Judges can lose points for extensive 
absences or poor courtroom behavior.  Other targets reflect Party 
political interests.  For example, tribunals and judges can receive 
(or lose) points depending on whether they have held the proper 
number of conferences on Party theory or produced the requisite 
number of propaganda articles.56  Still other targets are directly 
linked to judicial performance in handling cases.  Judges face 
annual target ratios for mediation,57 case closure,58 and appellate 
 
54 Interview with Chinese official, in Beijing China (on file with author).   
55 See Ai Jiahui, Zhongguo fayuan jixiao kaoping zhidu yanjiu [Research On 
Chinese Court Performance Evaluation Systems], 83 LAW & SOC. DEV. 70 (2008) 
(providing a comprehensive discussion of Chinese court systems). 
56 See generally Minzner, supra note 20 (explaining the various methods by 
which internal disciplinary systems at local Chinese courts work).  Still other 
systems sanction judges for numerical, grammatical, or spelling errors in their 
judgments. Hebei 75 ming shenpanyuan yin xiaci an shou zhuijiu [75 Hebei Judges 
Sanctioned for Errors in Their Cases], YANZHAO DUSHI BAO [YANZHAO METROPOLITAN 
DAILY], Dec. 3, 2008, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-03 
/020216770609.shtml. 
57 See, e.g., Du Xichen, Shi fayuan minshang anjian tiaojie lü da 70.6% 
[Commercial Tribunal Municipal Court Mediation Rate Reaches 70.6%], Linghai 
Government Website, http://www.lnlh.gov.cn/news/news.asp?id=107 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2009) (P.R.C.) (noting that the court responsibility system requires 
each tribunal to reach a target of 70 percent of mediated cases, in conjunction with 
an effort to reduce citizen petitioning—i.e. shangfang—and that individual 
tribunals are docked or awarded points depending on whether they reach or 
exceed the target ratio). 
58 See, e.g., Tonghai xian renmin fayuan gangwei mubiao guanli zeren zhi 
ban’an jiangcheng kaohe banfa [Tonghai County People's Court Reward and 
Punishment System for Target Goals], issued Nov. 25, 2002, art. 2(2)(2)(1) (P.R.C.), 
available at http://fy.tonghai.gov.cn/news.asp?id=88 [hereinafter Tonghai 
Measures] (setting annual case closure targets ranging from 70 to 98% for different 
tribunals). 
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reversal.59  Thus, for example, individual Chinese judges and 
tribunals may face expectations that they close 100% of criminal 
cases in a given year, successfully mediate 80% of civil cases, or 
have no more than 2% of their cases reversed on appeal.  Other 
numerical targets include: enforcement ratios, average numbers of 
cases handled by individual judges, and numbers of citizen 
petitions (shangfang) to higher-level Party or government 
authorities generated by citizen discontent with court decisions.60 
Chinese court responsibility systems also employ liability 
principles that parallel those found in their administrative and 
Party counterparts.  Court presidents and tribunal heads bear 
vicarious responsibility—and receive corresponding sanctions or 
rewards—for ensuring that their subordinates make target.61 
Some systems apply collective sanctions.  Under such systems, 
judges receive financial penalties (or bonuses) for the failure (or 
success) of their tribunals to make target.62  Last, some local court 
responsibility systems apply strict liability principles to sanction 
judges.  For example, some local court systems automatically 
sanction judges or tribunals for any case reversed on appeal, even 
if the reversal was for simple legal error arising from 
 
59 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 69–73 (explaining the types of liability that 
judges can receive as a result of negative appellate review or reversals of their 
decisions). 
60 See Fujian sheng gaoji renmin fayuan yanjiu shi [Research Department of 
the Fujian HPC], Fujian fayuan shenpan yeji pinggu tixi de goujian he yingyong 
[Creation and Application of an Evaluation System for the Trial Work of Fujian Courts], 
RENMIN SIFA [PEOPLE’S JUDICIARY J.], Dec. 2006, at 41 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Fujian 
Evaluation System] (describing targets used on a province-wide basis by the 
Fujian High People’s Court). 
61 See Gaocheng shi renmin fayuan gongzuo mubiao guanli kaohe jiangli 
banfa shishi xize [Gaocheng Municipal People’s Court Implementation Details for 
the Management of the Work Target Assessments and Rewards], issued Aug. 14, 
2002, art. 22(1) (P.R.C.), available at http://gcsfy.chinacourt.org/public/ 
detail.php?id=64; Zhenping xian renmin fayuan 2006 nian gangwei mubiao 
zerenzhi ji kaopíng banfa (shìxíng) [Zhenping County People’s Court 2006 
Responsibility System and Assessment Measures (Provisional)], issued Feb. 15, 
2006, art. 5(a) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Zhenping System]; Guanghan fayuan 2004 
niandu gangwei mubiao guanli kaohe banfa [Guanghan Court 2004 Evaluation 
System for the Management of Annual Work Targets], issued May 17, 2004, art. 24 
(P.R.C.), available at http://ghfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=285; See also 
Zhou Jianhao, Renmin fayuan cuo’an zeren zhuijiuzhi xin shijiao [New Look at 
Responsibility Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases], NAT’L JUDGES C.L.J. (P.R.C.) 
52, 54 (2003) (noting the problems generated by responsibility system that apply 
vicarious liability to tribunal heads for errors of judges). 
62 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 63 (analyzing Chinese court responsibility 
systems used to evaluate and discipline judges). 
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fundamentally unclear laws or regulations, rather than any failing 
of the judge himself.63 
The above discussion is simply the tip of the iceberg.  Chinese 
authorities use responsibility arrangements based on similar 
principles to create incentives for a wide range of actors, including 
non-state ones.  Heads of village committees, not technically part 
of the Chinese government apparatus, commonly sign 
responsibility contracts with township officials linking their 
success in meeting particular governance targets to concrete 
financial bonuses.64  As part of the campaign to maintain social 
order for the 2008 Olympics, urban residents’ committees 
compelled individual businesses throughout Beijing to sign 
responsibility arrangements and assume liability for any activities 
of their employees that disrupted social order.65  A range of local 
authorities have experimented with similar systems holding 
employers or landlords vicariously responsible for infractions by 
their migrant workers or residents, such as failure to comply with 
birth control policies.66 
2.3. Functions 
Responsibility systems play critical institutional roles in the 
Chinese political and legal system.  They are tools that central 
authorities can use to push local officials to address particular 
issues of concern.  They are transmission belts by which vague 
central legal and administrative norms are operationalized into 
meaningful directives for local authorities to carry out.  And they 
are top-down monitoring devices that assist central authorities in 
addressing pervasive principal-agent problems in the Chinese 
bureaucracy. 
 
63 Id.  
64 YANG ZHONG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CHINA: CHALLENGES 
FROM BELOW 140–41 (2003). 
65 Xin Jing Bao, 29 wan zhi’an zhiyuanzhe xunfang jingcheng [290,000 Public 
Order Volunteers Patrol Beijing], BEIJING NEWS, July 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/olympic/2008/07-31/018@082041.htm. 
66 See, e.g., Wang Congrui, Zhongmei sanjian sanshi gongcheng chu quanfangwei 
luoshi jihua shengyu guanli fuwu gongzuo zerenzhi [Zhongmei Third Construction 
Group, NO. 30 Engineering Unit Fully Implements Birth Control Management Work 
Responsibility System], Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://ldrk.ahpfpc.gov.cn 
/page.php?fp=newsdetail&id=11708 (describing the implementation of family 
planning policies in a particular work unit). 
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First, higher-level authorities can use responsibility systems as 
a rudder to steer lower levels of the bureaucracy.  As Chinese 
scholars themselves note, the combination of work targets, 
significant career and financial rewards and sanctions, and 
vicarious and collective liability for leaders and units, create a 
“pressurized system.”67  “Making target” (or at least appearing to 
do so) is all-important for local officials.  Higher-level Chinese 
authorities can consequently pressure local authorities to devote 
more or less attention to particular target areas through their 
choice of responsibility targets.  Unsurprisingly, central authorities 
consistently prioritize targets (such as birth control statistics) that 
are associated with core, long-term national policies (such as 
population planning). 
Higher authorities can also use responsibility targets as an 
electric cattle prod to jolt the bureaucratic apparatus into 
addressing pressing short-term tasks.  During the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, for example, central authorities faced the need to 
maintain stability and uphold China’s external image in the face of 
international attention.  They responded with a sweeping 
campaign setting severe career sanctions for any local Party or 
government officials whose actions led to outbreaks of protests or 
mass petitions.68 
Authorities continually tinker with targets depending on 
practical need or prevailing political winds.69  In 2002–2003, China 
 
67 Tony Saich, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analysing the Local State in 
China, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: CONFLICTS, GROWTH AND CRISIS 75, 94 (Luigi 
Tomba ed., 2002). 
68 Chris Buckley, China Announces Olympics Stability Drive After Riot, REUTERS, 
June 30, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis 
/idUSPEK40331; Guanyu weifan xinfang gongzuo jilü chufen zanxing guiding 
[Temporary Decision Regarding Sanctions for Disciplinary Violations of Letters 
and Visits Work], (promulgated by the Cent. Party Discipline Comm., effective 
July 24, 2008) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-07/24 
/content_1054991.htm (setting out disciplinary sanctions for officials whose 
actions generate mass petitions); Weifan xinfang gongzuo jilü shiyong dangji chufen 
tiaoli ruogan wenti jieshi [Interpretation of Relevant Questions Regarding the Application 
of Party Disciplinary Sanctions for Violations of  Disciplinary Violations of Letters and 
Visits Work], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 24, 2008, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/24/content_8762985.htm 
(explaining Party disciplinary sanctions for Party members whose actions 
generate citizen petitions). 
69 See Whiting, supra note 10, at 114–15 (discussing how Chinese authorities 
changed tax and finance targets in the wake of negative experiences with earlier 
targets). 
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experienced a leadership transition when Hu Jintao assumed office 
as head of the Chinese Party and state.  Both Hu and his premier, 
Wen Jiabao, sought to alter the course of the Chinese bureaucracy.  
They wanted to reduce the emphasis on economic development set 
by their predecessors, and focus attention on a broader range of 
social and environmental issues.  Noting that the “mild 
environment management and legal measures [used] in the past 
have proved to be ineffective” to combat increasing environmental 
damage,70 deputy director of the State Environmental Protection 
Agency Pan Yue and other Chinese reformers promoted efforts to 
directly affect the calculations of local officials by adjusting 
personnel evaluation and responsibility systems.  In particular, 
they supported the development of new responsibility targets for 
issues such as environmental protection.71  Since 2004, Chinese 
authorities have experimented with adopting the concept of 
“Green GDP” into the cadre evaluation process.  By adopting 
environmentally-adjusted measures of economic growth as the 
basis for local cadre performance, reformers hope to counteract 
incentives for local officials to grant approval to illegal and 
environmentally hazardous projects simply to improve their 
economic development scores.72 
Similar tinkering occurs within the legal system.  In the last 
several years, central court authorities have altered their emphasis 
regarding the work of the Chinese judiciary.  They have sought to 
encourage local courts to dispose of cases through mediation, 
rather than trial.73  Shifting responsibility targets has been a critical 
 
70 Green GDP to be Expanded Nationally, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www1.china.org.cn/english/China/196436.htm. 
71 Zhao Xiaohui, Wei Wu, Zhongguo dui pianmian zhuiqiu GDP zengzhang shuo 
bu fazhan mubiao yirenweiben [China Says No to Single-Minded Pursuit of Economic 
Development, Development Targets to Take People as Their Core], SINA NEWS, Mar. 4, 
2004, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-03-04/03522991070.shtml 
(discussing the shift in emphasis in responsibility systems away from economic 
growth); Carlos Lo & Shui-yan Tang, Institutional Reform: Economic Changes, and 
Local Environmental Management in China, 15 ENVTL. POL. 189, 202-04 (2006) 
(examining local environmental bureau efforts to introduce new environmental 
responsibility systems). 
72 Baohu huanjing jiu shi zhengji zhongguo yao yong lüse GDP [Protecting the 
Environment is an Official [Target] Achievement, China Will Use Green GDP to 
Evaluate Local Officials], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 8, 2008,  available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/08/content_1351140.htm. 
73 See Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality?  Historical 
Legacies and Legal Reform 22–25 (Mar. 31, 2009) (unpublished paper, on file with 
author) (discussing the increased recent emphasis by Chinese courts on 
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tool in this endeavor.  Court officials have ramped up the 
importance of numerical rates of cases closed through mediation in 
systems for evaluating local courts and judges.  They have required 
regular public disclosure of mediation statistics.  And they have 
awarded titles such as “Pace-Setting Mediator” to high-performing 
judges, along with resulting financial rewards, in an effort to 
stimulate competition between judges to outperform each other in 
their mediation efforts.74 
Second, responsibility targets play a critical functional role in 
interpreting and “operationalizing” abstract central norms.  
Following the issuance of a broad directive by national authorities 
(such as the 2004 central directive to improve Party governance), 
there is a “cascade” effect as it is transmitted level-by-level down 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy.  Lower-level authorities 
progressively flesh out the vague language of the central orders 
with increasing detail and instructions as to how to implement 
them.75  Responsibility systems are a crucial link in this process.  
 
mediation); Fayuan gao tiaojie jiean lv beihou de yinyou [Concerns Behind Courts High 
Rates of Case Closure Through Mediation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], June 11, 2009, 
available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/0801/2009-06/11/content 
_1104238.htm (examining the positive and negative effects of the increased 
emphasis on mediation). 
74 Duoyuan tiaojie jianxiao Anhui minshangshi an tiaojielv 3 nian you 28% shang 
sheng dao 50% [Diverse Mediation (System) Proves Effective, Mediation Rates for Civil 
Commercial Cases in Anhui (Province) Increase From 28% to 50% in Three Years], 
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], May 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/zfdt/2009-05/04/content_72640.htm (discussing 
relevant measures taken in Anhui province to promote mediation). 
75 For an example of this process, see Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang 
dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding [Central Party Committee Decision Regarding 
Strengthening Party Governance Capacity], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 19, 2004, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-09/26/content 
_2024232.htm (broad national Central Party directive instructing local officials to 
strengthen Party governance, respond to citizen discontent, address official errors, 
and adopt responsibility systems); Huludao City Working Committee, 
Zhonggong Fujian shengwei guanche “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang 
dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding” de shishi yijian [Fujian Communist 
Party Provincial Party Committee Implementation Opinion Regarding The 
“Central Party Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening Party Governance 
Capacity], issued 2004, art. 4(4) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.hldjgdj.gov.cn 
/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1149 (Fjian provincial Party committee 
directive calling for carrying out the central directive, fleshing out the aims of the 
central orders by adding additional content, and calling for the use of 
responsibility systems to operationalize these orders); Shennongjia Lin District 
Party Committee, Zhonggong shennongjia lin qu weiyuanhui guanyu xuexi 
guanche “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli 
jianshe de jueding” de yijian [Shennongjia Lin District Party Committee 
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They translate abstract norms into more concrete targets that have 
meaning for lower level officials who have to implement them.  
They include critical details such as timetables, numerical 
evaluation standards, and specific delegations of responsibility to 
particular bureaus for ensuring that targets are met.76 
Legal norms experience this process of translation as well.  The 
2002 Law on Safe Production, for example, sets out a range of 
broad national goals.  These include production safety standards, 
the rights of workers to a safe workplace, and institutional 
channels for supervising these goals.77  As this mandate percolated 
down through the bureaucracy, provincial and county authorities 
fleshed it out with target goals and punishments incorporated into 
target responsibility systems facing relevant authorities.78  Vague 
 
Implementation Opinion Regarding Studying And Carrying Out The “Central 
Party Committee Decision Regarding Strengthening Party Governance 
Capacity”], issued 2004 (P.R.C.), available at http://mslt.snj.gov.cn/snjxx 
/main/snjnews/2005/010502.htm (local Party committee directive calling for the 
implementation of the national and provincial directives, adding content not 
specifically referenced in the national directive, such as strengthening local 
judicial responsibility systems for incorrectly decided cases).  See also Zhonggong 
pingliang shiwei guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang yifa zhi shi gongzuo de yijian 
[Pingliang Municipal Communist Party Committee Opinion Regarding 
Strengthening the Work of Managing the City According to Law], issued Aug. 9, 
2005, art. 2(3) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.pingliang.gov.cn/ 
PingLiangWebSite/PartyCommitee/FilesDetail.jsp?organ_id=2&doc_id=1341. 
Similar implementation processes occur in the wake of any broad central Party 
policy initiative.  See, e.g., Chinese President Urges Implementation of Anti-Corruption 
Responsibility System, SINA NEWS, Oct. 21, 2008, available at http://english.sina.com 
/china/2008/1020/192928.html (calling for local authorities to create anti-
corruption responsibility systems to carry out a central campaign). 
76 See, e.g., Party Organization Bureau of Kaiping Municipality, Guanyu 
Kaiping shi dangzheng jiguan he hangye zuofeng jianshe kaohe shishi yijian 
[Opinion Regarding Implementation The Evaluation of Kaiping Municipal Party 
and Government Organ Work], issued 2004, available at http://zzb.kaiping.gov.cn 
/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=450 (setting forth specific assessment responsibilities 
and guidelines for government bureaus). 
77 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo anquan shengchan fa [Law on Safe 
Production] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 
2002, effective Nov. 1, 2002) 2002 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 
(P.R.C.), arts. 16–67, available at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-08/05 
/content_20950.htm. 
78 Id.  See also Hunan sheng anquan shengchan tiaoli [Hunan Regulations on 
Safe Production], issued Sept. 28, 2004 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.law-lib 
.com/law/law_view.asp?id=87745 (discussing sanctions for violations of the 
Regulations on Safe Production); Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu ban’gongshi 
guanyu yinfa 2006 nian anquan shengchan zeren mubiao guanli kaohe banfa de 
tongzhi [Notice of the General Office of the Yongshun County People’s 
Government Regarding the Issuance of the 2006 Evaluation Measures for the Safe 
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language regarding the rights of trade unions and workers to 
participate in the oversight of work safety disappeared.  In its 
place: numerical target goals capable of being measured.  County-
level systems established 100-point scales for grading officials on 
production safety.  These set out targets for “safe production” legal 
propaganda events that local officials were expected to carry out.  
They delineated permissible numbers and scale of work accidents 
that were allowed to occur.  And they specified the corresponding 
personnel sanctions for bureaus and officers who failed to reach 
these target goals, such as requiring the immediate resignation of 
relevant officials whose jurisdictions experienced accidents 
resulting in more than 10 deaths.79  Through this process, the 
relatively vague content of central laws was translated into 
meaningful operational instructions for front-line local county and 
township authorities, and cast in terms of strict, collective, and 
vicarious liability linked to specific target goals. 
Third, responsibility systems are a core tool for central 
authorities to address severe principal-agent problems.  This may 
seem counterintuitive at first glance.  Influenced by news photos of 
public security forces rounding up dissidents, outsiders often view 
the Chinese state as an all-powerful authoritarian monolith.  Many 
assume that Chinese central authorities are able to assert their will 
throughout the system at all times.  But central authorities actually 
 
Production Target Responsibility System], issued Feb. 9, 2006 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.ysx.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2902 (laying out 
safe production evaluation standards in Yongshun County).  For examples of 
similar processes of translating legal norms into concrete targets, see Shengchan 
anquan shigu baogao he diaocha chuli tiaoli [Regulations on Reporting, 
Investigating, and Handling Safety Production Accidents], issued April 9, 2007 
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/19/content_588577.htm; 
Tongzhou shi anquan shengchan mubiao kaohe xize [Details for the Tongzhou 
Municipal Safe Production Target Evaluation System], issued Oct. 26, 2007 
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.tz.gov.cn/tzdz/UploadFile 
//200711060903491450.doc. 
79 Under the Yongshun county system, for example, officials who experience 
a production accident resulting in one to two deaths lose their ability to be 
selected as “outstanding” that year.  Accidents resulting in from three to nine 
deaths result in the loss of officials’ ability to be re-nominated for their position, 
while accidents resulting in more than ten deaths require the immediate 
resignation of the relevant official.  Yongshun xian renmin zhengfu ban’gongshi 
guanyu yinfa 2006 nian anquan shengchan zeren mubiao guanli kaohe banfa de 
tongzhi [Notice of the General Office of the Yongshun County People’s 
Government Regarding the Issuance of the 2006 Evaluation Measures for the Safe 
Production Target Responsibility System], issued Feb. 9, 2006, art. 8 (P.R.C.), 
available at  http://www.ysx.gov.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2902. 
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face extreme difficulties in regularly imposing their will on their 
local agents.80  They lack the time and energy to comprehensively 
monitor local agents’ work around the clock.  They also lack 
reliable and independent channels of information to do so.  The 
centralized control enjoyed by a few local Party authorities over 
local governments, legislatures, courts, and media outlets, means 
that they can choke off negative information to Beijing that reflects 
poorly on their performance.  Following a large industrial accident 
that caused a massive benzene leak on the Songhua River in 
November 2005, for example, Jilin provincial officials simply 
barred any reporting on the incident for over a week, blinding 
central authorities as to the extent of the crisis.81 
Naturally, central Party authorities attempt to defeat such 
concealment.  As with their imperial predecessors, they use direct 
observation as one tactic.  High-level Chinese authorities conduct 
regular inspection tours to see how central policies are being 
carried out.  These are often cloaked in secrecy to prevent local 
officials from learning in advance which areas will be investigated.  
Zhao Shukai, a State Council researcher, notes cases in which 
provincial-level birth control inspection teams do not know their 
destinations when they set off on survey inspections.  Rather, they 
are given three letters.  The first, to be opened upon departure, tells 
them which county they are to proceed to.  The second, to be 
opened on arrival in the designated county, tells them which 
township to inspect.  The last, to be opened upon arrival in the 
township, specifically instructs them which villages to survey.  
This theoretically limits the ability of local officials to conceal facts 
on the ground (for example, by temporarily hiding unregistered 
 
80 Kevin J. O’Brien, Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: Boundary-Spanning 
Contention in China, 8 MOBILIZATION 51, 60 (2003) (explaining problems 
confronted by central authorities seeking to monitor subordinates); Murray Scot 
Tanner & Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over 
Policing and Obstacles to “Rule of Law” in China, 191 CHINA Q., 644, 646-47 (2007) 
(discussing difficulties encountered by central authorities in monitoring local 
public security officials). 
81 Kim Hunter Gordon, Ssh, Don’t Mention it to the Emperor, GUARDIAN, Dec. 
4, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/dec/04 
/business.china. The incident led to an international incident with Russia, and 
generated panic among the residents of the provincial capital denied accurate 
information as to why their municipal water system had been shut off. 
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children), or engaging in advance collusion with the inspection 
teams (for example, by bribing them).82 
But local officials can defeat even these controls.  As one 
township official noted: 
Actually, [these surprise inspections] can be circumvented; 
it just requires the use of calculation and manpower.  First, 
regardless of how secretive preparations for the inspection 
are, we are always able to figure out when [the inspection 
team] enters our [prefecture], because we have contacts in 
the provincial government. We even know their license 
plate number.  Second, once they have entered our 
[prefecture], things are easier to handle.  Relevant bureaus 
from the prefecture and each county monitor the inspection 
teams.  [We] even know what restaurant they ate at, what 
they ate, and what time they left the following day.  Third, 
along their route, county and township authorities set up 
observers.  We can establish where the [inspectors] are 
going and where they stop.  Fourth, once we determine 
their trail, it is easy for us to determine what days they are 
likely to enter our township.  That way, we can warn in 
advance those villages that are in the scope of the 
sample . . . and allow those families with children in excess 
of the birth quotas to hide themselves.  In this manner, we 
generally manage to pass these inspections without 
incident.83 
Other scholars reach similar conclusions.  In a comprehensive 
2007 study of central-local police relations, Green and Tanner 
surveyed the wide formal powers that central Chinese authorities 
possess for monitoring and controlling their local agents, such as 
 
82 Zhao Shukai, Xiangzhen zhengfu de yingchou shenghuo [The Life of 
Entertaining (Higher Level Officials) in Township Government], in 2006 ZHONG GUO 
FAZHAN YANJIU—GUOWUYUAN FAZHAN JANJIU ZHONGXIU GAO GAOXUAN [2006 
CHINA DEVELOPMENT STUDIES—STATE COUNCIL’S DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL] 
247 (Ma Hong & Wang Mengkui eds., 2006). 
83 Id. at 247–48.  Setting up Potemkin villages is another option.  Examples of 
local Chinese officials misleading central inspection teams or high-ranking visitors 
through such tactics are legion.  See CHEN GUIDI & WU CHUNTAO, AN 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONDITION OF THE CHINESE PEASANTRY, translated at 
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20040228_4.htm (providing a 1998 example of one 
such effort by Anhui officials to mislead visiting premier Zhu Rongji as to the 
success of local grain policies). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
82 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:1 
issuing central laws and policies and setting personnel quotas.  But 
they conclude that these mechanisms: 
[do] not translate into detailed, effective control over local 
police behaviour.  The powers in the hands of local party-
state leaders—leadership authority, hiring of regular 
officers, leading cadre management, finance and budgeting, 
and setting salaries—still loom much larger . . . .  [I]n this 
cornerstone sector of state power—legal coercion—the 
levers of central control over provinces and localities are 
relatively weak, and very shallow in their reach.84 
Bottom-up monitoring is another strategy employed by central 
authorities.85  Since 1978, Chinese authorities have turned away 
from fiery Maoist-style political campaigns as a means of stirring 
up the populace and checking the behavior of local officials.  But 
central authorities have created a range of systems that harness 
limited bottom-up citizen participation to assist in the 
administrative monitoring of local authorities.  Some date back to 
the creation of the PRC, or earlier.  Examples include the state 
media and xinfang (letters and visits) system as locales for citizens 
to present their grievances to higher authorities regarding local 
abuses.86  Others are newer.  Over the last 30 years, Chinese 
authorities have experimented with creating legal and electoral 
channels for citizens to contest the actions of local authorities.  
Examples include the Administrative Litigation Law (allowing 
citizens a limited right to sue government officials) and the 
Organic Law on Villagers Committees (authorizing elections for 
village committees).87  As each of these channels has opened up, 
 
84 Tanner & Green, supra note 80, at 668–69. 
85 Jing Vivian Zhan, Decentralizing China: Analysis of Central Strategies in 
China’s Fiscal Reforms, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 445, 449-51 (2009) (discussing bottom-
up reporting and the problems associated with it). 
86 See generally Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?  The Media in 
the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005) (analyzing the role of media 
in the Chinese legal system); Minzner, supra note 8 (analyzing the xinfang system). 
87 Nathan has termed these “input institutions.”  Andrew J. Nathan, 
Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6, 14–15 (2003) (defining input 
institutions as institutions that citizens can use to apprise the state of their 
concerns). 
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Chinese citizens have indeed actively used them to seek redress of 
their grievances and expose misbehavior of local authorities.88 
But central reliance on bottom-up monitoring also carries risks.  
As discussed in greater detail below, as each of these channels has 
opened up, citizen use of them has gone beyond what central 
authorities are comfortable with.  Both electoral and legal reforms 
have permitted the emergence of a cadre of activists who use them 
not only to challenge the bad behavior of individual local officials, 
but also to bring a wider range of politicized grievances that 
implicate local (or even national) policies.  From the standpoint of 
central authorities implacably committed to maintaining Party 
control, these represent worrying trends that must be closely 
controlled and, if necessary, suppressed.89 
So if direct monitoring is limited in its effectiveness, and 
bottom-up monitoring is dangerous in practice, what to do? 
Faced with this dilemma, responsibility systems are a logical 
governance choice.  Take the use of numerical targets.  Broad 
instructions to local authorities such as “take reasonable economic 
measures to improve product safety” or “strengthen 
environmental protection” are simply too difficult for central 
authorities to check up on.  They disappear in the ocean of local 
Chinese governance, leaving not a ripple behind.  In contrast, 
easily quantifiable work statistics (numbers of mine explosions, 
petitioners in Beijing, judicial cases reversed, GDP statistics) have a 
natural appeal for administrators.90  They are simple and direct.  
They at least offer some concrete targets for higher officials to 
evaluate and grade, in contrast to entirely qualitative reports from 
local authorities.  Numerical targets also allow higher officials to 
draw comparisons across jurisdictions to ferret out outliers or low 
performers.91  This partially helps address the problem of 
subjective self-reporting (or, lying) by local authorities. 
 
88 See Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, The Politics of Lodging Complaints in 
Rural China, 143 CHINA Q. 756 (1995) (describing these channels and citizens’ use 
of them). 
89 See infra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. 
90 Interview, Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court judge, in Shanghai, China 
(on file with author). 
91 Fujian High People’s Court officials make this point in their discussion of 
their provincial system.  See Fujian Evaluation System, supra note 60, at 42.  
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Naturally, this is only a partial solution.  Local authorities 
manipulate numerical statistics as well.92  For example, according 
to Tsai’s survey of 316 villages, 81% of village officials admitted 
falsifying income data reported to higher officials (with an average 
discrepancy between real and reported income of 44%!).93  This 
creates a problem.  How do you evaluate the performance of your 
subordinates when they can alter the very data you have to rely on 
to conduct your evaluation? 
One possibility is to rely on criteria that are more difficult to 
fudge.94  Local officials certainly can find ways to pretend to be in 
compliance with targets such as “no mine explosions killing more 
than 10 people” or “generate investment of at least 1 million yuan 
into your county over the next six months.”  Mine disasters can be 
covered up; investment figures can be altered.  But doing so 
requires hiding bodies, forging bank records, and paying off the 
relevant people.  It is certainly more difficult than simply lying 
about one’s own performance in a qualitative report (“Yet another 
outstanding year again, boss”) or altering statistics that are entirely 
within the control of local officials (number of work conferences 
held).  This added level of difficulty is precisely why particular 
numerical targets linked to harder-to-conceal events are attractive 
to central authorities seeking to monitor their subordinates. 
Even better, from the perspective of higher authorities, are 
targets that they can directly observe themselves, without relying 
on reporting by local officials.  Numbers of cases reversed on 
appeal may be a crude proxy for the efficiency of lower-level 
courts and the numbers of disgruntled petitioners from a particular 
jurisdiction who show up outside central government offices in 
Beijing may be a flawed tool for assessing the work of Party 
officials in that jurisdiction.  But in the upper altitudes of a 
centralized bureaucracy starved for accurate tools to assess the 
performance of its local agents, both types of targets have a critical 
advantage over others.  Higher-level authorities can look in their 
 
92 Zhan, supra note 85, at 449 (explaining that because data reported by local 
authorities is used for performance evaluation, incentives exist for local 
authorities to exaggerate achievements). 
93 Lily Tsai, The Falsification of Village Income Statistics, 196 CHINA Q. 805, 809 
(2008). 
94 Landry, supra note 41, at 202–06.  
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own files (or out their windows) and actually collect the 
information themselves.95 
Higher-level authorities’ use of strict, collective, and vicarious 
liability can be understood in the same light.  These are 
institutional responses to pervasive informational gaps and 
principal-agent problems in the Chinese bureaucracy.  Take strict 
liability.  Establishing why local authorities failed to meet 
designated work targets requires higher officials to make difficult 
assessments as to the veracity of local officials’ claims (“We really 
tried to meet the birth control targets, boss, but there was this 
thing . . .”).  Establishing specifically who should bear responsibility 
for failures poses similar problems (“The string of recent mine 
explosions isn’t my fault, boss—it’s Xiao Zhang’s”).  Evaluating 
these claims requires access to information under the control of 
local officials—information that can be difficult or impossible for 
central officials to obtain.  Strict liability resolves these problems by 
limiting the need for central authorities to engage in complex fault-
based analyses.  It allows higher officials to simply disburse 
sanctions (or rewards) based on the failure (or success) of local 
officials to reach the specified goal. 
Vicarious liability is attractive for the same reason.  Higher-
level Chinese authorities simply don’t have the time, energy, or 
resources to investigate each time a Party committee, government 
bureau, imperial magistrate, or group of yamen runners fails to 
meet a target.  Requiring the head of the unit to bear vicarious 
liability for the failure is an administratively direct and simple 
resolution to this problem.  It offloads the responsibility for 
monitoring subordinate employees, and for figuring out how to 
actually reach the set target, on individual Party, government, and 
unit leaders.  Moreover, it makes sense—after all, the relevant 
Party leader exercises sweeping authority over bureau operations.  
Why not tag him or her with responsibilities for all of its failures? 
Collective responsibility provides similar advantages.  As two 
Henan basic-level court officials noted in touting their 
responsibility system, “[t]ightly linking the interests of the work 
unit and the interests of the individual makes efforts aimed at 
 
95 This may be a crucial reason why reform of the “letters and visits” (xinfang) 
petitioning system is so institutionally difficult in China.  Higher-level Chinese 
authorities are dependent—perhaps addicted—to the stream of both qualitative 
and quantitative information that the xinfang system brings to them regarding 
what is taking place at the local levels in their own country. 
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fulfilling the targets the conscious action of every [court] officer.”96  
Tying the personal economic interests of individual officials to the 
success or failure of their colleagues (or their unit as a whole) 
encourages them to watch (or assist) each other in “making target.”  
This reduces the need for central authorities to individually 
monitor particular subordinates. 
Top-down responsibility systems fulfill another important 
political function as well.  They ensure that local officials remain 
dependent on satisfying higher-level mandates for their career 
advancement and legitimacy, rather than on cultivating a populist 
following among residents in their jurisdictions.  Individual local 
officials occasionally pursue such strategies.97  These pose 
problems for centralized one-Party control, because they create the 
spectre that a local leader may build up political legitimacy 
independent of the Party’s own organization, fracturing the 
system. 
For precisely this reason, central Party authorities remain 
extremely leery of allowing bottom-up monitoring principles to 
penetrate the cadre evaluation process.  Since the late 1990s, Party 
authorities have allowed limited local experiments that include 
popular opinion as a component of selecting and evaluating Party 
and government cadres.98  But they have severely cabined these 
efforts.  Party regulations allow citizens only a small role in 
nominating potential candidates for positions.  They charge higher-
 
96 Su Jiacheng & Wang Lishen, Shuzi hua fayuan guanli moshi de changshi [An 
Experiment in Numerical Court Management], 11 PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 51 (2006) 
97 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Electoral Reforms in 
Sichuan Aid Populist Local Official, 21ST CENUTRY BUS. HERALD, Oct. 27, 2004, 
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle 
=2672 (providing an example of populist strategies employed in Sichuan). 
98 Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo zanxing tiaoli, 
[Temporary Regulations on the Selection of Leading Party and Government 
Cadres], issued Feb. 9, 1995, arts. 10(6), 15 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/177918.htm; Dang zheng lingdao 
ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli, [Regulations on the Selection of Leading 
Party and Government Cadres], issued July 9, 2002, art. 12(6) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
2002 Selection Regulations], available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB 
/shizheng/16/20020723/782504.html; see also Whiting, supra note 10, at 105 
(noting that a 2000 State Council reform outline placed greater emphasis on both 
professional competence and public opinion but without introducing any 
meaningful democratization); Jiceng jianchayuan gongzuo lianghua guanli chuyi 
[Humble Opinions on the Management of Work Evaluation of Basic-Level 
Procuratorates] (promulgated by Jingmen City, Dongbao District, Basic-Level 
Procuratorate, effective April 25, 2005), available at http://www.jingshan.jcy 
.gov.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=477 (P.R.C.). 
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level officials with exercising tight control over the candidate pool 
and the actual selection process.99  And they further specify that a 
candidate’s popular support should not be allowed to become a 
determinative factor in the selection process.100 
2009 Yunnan draft provincial regulations provide one example 
of such efforts.101  They govern the evaluations of key municipal 
(prefectural-level) Party, government, and court officials.  The draft 
regulations set a range of work targets, including crime statistics, 
tax revenue, and growth in per-capita GDP and rural incomes,102 
that account for 60% of officials’ numerical evaluations.  The 
remaining 40% of the evaluation is split equally between the 
results of a given official’s “democratic evaluation” (minzhu ceping) 
and “popular opinion survey” (minyi diaocha).103  But actual 
popular participation is quite restricted.  Opinions of current and 
former Party and government officials dominate both processes.  
“Democratic evaluation,” for example, consists of surveying 
current municipal Party committee members, key leaders in the 
municipal people’s congress, court, procuratorate, Party 
disciplinary inspection committee, and subordinate county 
governments, as well as municipal leaders who have retired within 
the last three years.104 
2.4. A Comparative Look 
Chinese reliance on strict, vicarious, and collective liability to 
govern is not cultural.  Rather, it is an institutional response to 
informational and principal-agent problems.  Western legal 
 
99 2002 Selection Regulations, arts. 13–17, 35–36. 
100 Id. art. 17. 
101 Yunnan sheng zhoushi dangzheng lingdao banzi he lingdao ganbu 
zonghe kaohe pingjia shishi banfa (shixing) [zhengqiu yijian gao] [(Experimental) 
Yunnan Provincial Implementing Measures for the Comprehensive Evaluation of 
Leading Prefectural-Level Municipal Party and Government Cadres] (proposed 
by the Kunming Municipal Personnel Bureau, Feb. 24, 2009), available at 
http://rsj.km.gov.cn/ImNews/List.asp?Id=8596 (P.R.C.). 
102 For a list of the types of targets, see id., attached forms 1-1, 1-2.  
103 Id. art. 13. 
104 The regulations do allow for soliciting the opinions of others “who should 
be consulted” as part of a given official’s “democratic evaluation.”  Id. art. 8(7).  
But they provide that these numbers should generally not exceed 20% of those 
who participate.  The “popular opinion survey” provides for slightly broader 
participation, specifying that individuals surveyed should include delegates from 
municipal people’s congresses, representatives from municipal Party congresses 
and “popular representatives” (qunzong daibiao).  Id. art. 9. 
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systems rely on similar mechanisms to respond to similar 
problems.105 
Take strict liability.  It is a classic institutional response to 
monitoring problems caused by information gaps.  American tort 
law provides the obvious example.  Historically, tort recovery for 
injuries caused by product defects required proof of negligence—
demonstrating a particular failure of a duty of care toward the 
injured party.  But by the mid-20th century, industrial production 
chains had become highly extended and complicated.  An 
individual consumer faced extreme difficulty establishing exactly 
which (and whose) behavior in the production process was the 
cause of the exploding toaster that resulted in her injury.  
Confronted with this information gap, American courts altered the 
law, adopting a strict liability standard in product liability cases.  
This eliminated the need for individual consumers to prove fault 
on the part of the manufacturer.  And it placed the responsibility to 
monitor and avoid such defects on the manufacturer, identifying 
him as best positioned to decide how to do so.106 
Similarly, Western legal systems, both historical and modern, 
rely on collective and vicarious sanctions to respond to principal-
agent problems.  Under the medieval English system of 
frankpledge, for example, adult males were organized into groups 
of ten and held collectively liable for crimes of their members.107  
Collective liability also applied in the economic sphere.  An 
English merchant from town A conducting trade in town B could 
be held accountable by residents of B for debts previously incurred 
 
105 For a comprehensive and excellent exploration of these issues, see Daryl J. 
Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003).  Naturally, reliance on 
performance targets to manage sprawling bureaucracies is also not unique to 
China. The U.S. Government Performance Results Act of 1993 requires federal 
executive agencies to establish strategic plans and performance measures in 
annual planning and reporting to “improve the confidence of the American 
people in the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding 
Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results.”  U.S. Government 
Performance Results Act of 1993, 31 U.S.C. § 1115 (1993). 
106 For the logic underlying the California Supreme Court’s decision to alter 
the relevant legal standard, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. 377 P.2d 
897, 901–02 (Cal. 1963) (explaining that the purpose of such liability is to insure 
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured 
persons who are powerless to protect themselves). 
107 Parallels between frankpledge and the Chinese baojia system of collective 
responsibility might be an interesting subject of future study. 
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by a separate merchant from town A.108  Collective and vicarious 
sanctions exist in modern American law as well.  Manufacturers 
and suppliers face joint and several tort liability for product 
defects.  Employers are held vicariously liable for an employee’s 
wrongful acts committed within the scope of his employment.109 
As Levinson points out, these mechanisms do not reflect a 
“primitive” outlook common to pre-liberal, group-based societies.  
Rather, they are functional.  They help sanctioners address 
principal-agent problems.  They make “sense when group 
members have the capacity to monitor and control the behavior of 
some intuitively primary wrongdoer more efficiently than an 
external sanctioner.”110  Medieval English authorities lacked a 
centralized police force or bureaucratic state to exert 
individualized control over all members of society.  They lacked a 
national credit system for citizens in one town to monitor the debts 
of individual merchants from other towns.  In these circumstances, 
outsiders faced significant problems targeting particular 
wrongdoers.  Collective liability provided one way to address this 
problem.  It introduced incentives for members of a frankpledge 
group, or merchants from a particular town, to monitor the 
behavior of their colleagues and discipline them.  Rulers or 
sanctioners could thus offload the administrative burden of 
identifying and disciplining particular individuals on the group 
itself.111 
The growth of the modern state has altered some of the 
calculus that supports collective sanctions regimes.  Urbanization 
has broken down clan or kinship bonds that facilitate the intra-
group monitoring that collective sanctions regimes rely on to 
function.  Development of modern bureaucratic mechanisms (tax 
registration and credit bureaus) and legal institutions (independent 
national judiciaries) has made identification of individual 
wrongdoers easier, and resort to collective or vicarious sanctions 
less necessary.  Concepts of due process have emerged as a limit on 
the ability to sanction individuals for the behavior of another.112  
 
108 See Levinson, supra note 105, at 359; Avner Greif, Impersonal Exchange 
Without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 109, 
124–31 (2004). 
109 Levinson, supra note 105, at 360–62. 
110 Id. at 426. 
111 Id. at 357–59. 
112 Id. at 359–62. 
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But functional reasons for imposing collective and vicarious 
liability continue to exist in many areas.  Imposition of joint and 
several tort liability for manufacturers and suppliers in modern 
product liability cases is motivated by the relative difficulty that 
consumers face in identifying the precise wrongdoer in the 
production chain that was the source of their injury.113 
2.5. Summary 
The Chinese government itself is simply a very (very!) large 
principal-agent problem.114  Responsibility systems, in particular 
their extensive adoption of strict, collective, and vicarious liability 
principles, are a highly refined effort to address this problem.  
They are a core component of the way China is governed.  This is 
not new.  Nor is it cultural.  It is institutional.  Like medieval 
English monarchs, central Chinese leaders lack effective ways to 
monitor the actions of their local agents.  Like modern consumers, 
they lack effective means to identify the fault of particular (local 
government) actors.  Particularly in the context of a large 
authoritarian bureaucracy which is hesitant or unwilling to permit 
the development of independent institutional channels to monitor 
the actions of local officials, numerical responsibility targets tied to 
strict, collective, and vicarious liability are quite simply core 
mechanisms which allow the center to exercise some degree of 
control over their local agents.115 
3. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS 
 If responsibility systems serve a particular institutional role in 
the Chinese system, they also come at a cost.  Excessive central 
 
113 Id. at 368.  For functional arguments regarding the desirability of applying 
collective sanctions for ethical violations by modern American law firms, see 
Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336 
(2005). 
114 According to 2007 Chinese census data, there are roughly 60 million 
employees in Party and government organs.  NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF 
CHINA, 2007 CHINESE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2007), available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm.  By way of comparison, if 
the Chinese Party-state bureaucracy were an independent country, it would be the 
19th largest in the world, roughly the same size as France. 
115 A separate paper currently in progress by this author traces these efforts’ 
roots back to Legalist philosophy and Qin practices.  Again, this is not to prove a 
cultural basis for these elements.  To the contrary, it demonstrates the institutional 
continuity of both the problems confronted (and responses adopted) by the 
Chinese authoritarian bureaucratic state. 
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reliance on responsibility systems as a tool for monitoring local 
officials fuels a host of practical problems in local Chinese 
governance.  It also generates tension, and sometimes open 
conflict, with the thrust of post-1979 Chinese legal reform efforts. 
3.1. An Uneasy Overlap with Legal Norms 
Cadre responsibility systems overlap with formal legal norms.  
They establish binding norms on official behavior backed up with 
career and financial sanctions.  In some cases, these reinforce legal 
norms.  Some responsibility systems expressly purport to be 
implementing central laws or regulations.116  Some internalize legal 
outcomes and phenomena, such as the loss of an administrative 
litigation lawsuit or the creation of open government information 
standards that comply with national regulations, in their 
evaluation standards for local officials.117 
But in other cases, administrative performance targets create 
what Mashaw terms an “internal law of administration,” existing 
in uneasy tension with external legal norms.118  Sometimes, specific 
targets set by responsibility systems directly violate legal norms.  
For example, some local court responsibility systems sanction 
Chinese judges and courts for any instance of cases reversed on 
appeal, even those reversed for non-negligent legal error.119  (This 
incentivizes a range of problematic behavior on the part of trial 
court judges seeking to avoid sanctions for appellate reversal.120)  
 
116 See, e.g., Hebei System, supra note 47 (aimed at implementing the P.R.C 
Law on Safe Production and relevant Hebei provincial regulations); Changping 
qu caizheng ju guanyu xingzheng xuke shixiang guocuo zeren zhuijiu zhi 
[Changping District Finance Bureau Responsibility System Regarding Errors in 
Administrative Licensing], issued Jan. 1, 2005 (P.R.C.) (aimed at implementing the 
Administrative Licensing Law). 
117 Guanyu yinfa Zhenhai qu 2008 niandu xingzheng zhifa zerenzhi he 
zhengfu xinxi gongkai mubiao guanli kaohe fang’an de tongzhi [Notice on the 
Issuance of the 2008 Annual Evaluation System for the Administrative 
Enforcement and Open Government Information Target Responsibility System], 
issued July 21, 2008 (P.R.C.). 
118 JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 213 (1983). 
119 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 70 (discussing the relevant Jiangxi provincial 
regulation). 
120 Faced with numerical targets for cases reversed on appeal, for example, 
many judges resort to an ill-defined system of requesting advance guidance 
(qingshi) from higher courts and judges regarding how they should decide cases.  
As Chinese judges themselves note, such practices can undermine parties’ legal 
rights (particularly when the request is made in secret), weaken the value of 
appellate review, contribute to passivity and dependency on the part of lower 
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Such systems violate two 1998 Supreme People’s Court directives 
setting clear limits on judicial liability for “incorrectly decided 
cases” and barring judicial sanctions for cases reversed for simple 
legal error.121 
In other cases, responsibility systems create bureaucratic career 
incentives that inexorably pressure officials to violate central legal 
and Party norms, even if there is no direct facial conflict between 
them.  For example, the 2005 national “Letters and Visits” (Xinfang) 
Regulations require Chinese officials to accept citizen petitions for 
the redress of grievances.  They also bar official retaliation against 
petitioners who bring complaints.122  But local cadre responsibility 
systems severely sanction local officials who experience large 
numbers of petitions out of their jurisdictions to higher levels of 
government.  Faced with this pressure, local Chinese officials 
interested in keeping their jobs engage in a wide range of measures 
to prevent petitioners from reaching higher authorities, including 
illegal detentions, kidnappings, and psychiatric confinements.123 
Mediation targets create similar problematic incentives.  As 
mentioned earlier, court responsibility systems include rates of 
cases closed through judicial mediation as a component of judges’ 
 
courts, and inflate the workload of higher courts.  Su Yongtong, Bu an “fali” chupai 
de gaoyuan yuanzhang [A High People’s Court President Who Doesn’t Play According to 
“Legal Principles”], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Feb. 18, 2009, 
available at http://www.infzm.com/content/24067/1; Chai Jianguo & Wang 
Yanxia, Duli shenpan yu sifa tizhi gaige  [Adjudicate Independence and Judicial System 
Reforms], 23 HEBEI FAXUE [HEBEI JURISPRUDENCE] 85, 87 (2005) (providing 
comments by the director of the research office of the Hebei HPC).  For a similar 
point by a vice president of the Jiangsu HPC, see Liao Disheng, Lun sifa gongzheng 
xiaolü de shixian tujing [Discussion on Methods to Realizing Judicial Fairness and 
Efficiency], 2 JINLING FALÜ PINGLUN [JINLING L. REV.] 127, 130.  For an extended 
discussion on court responsibility systems for incorrectly decided cases, and their 
links to qingshi practices, see Minzner, supra note 20. 
121  Renmin fayuan shenpan renyuan weifa zeren zhuijiu banfa [The 
Responsibility Measures for the Illegal Behavior of Court Personnel], issued Aug. 
26, 1998, art. 22 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Responsibility Measures], available at 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/2003_10/5/2103413380.htm; Renmin 
fayuan shenpan jilu chufen banfa (shixing) [Experimental Disciplinary Measures 
for Court Trials], issued Sept. 7, 1998, art. 4 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Disciplinary 
Measures], available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=395.  
122  Xinfang tiaoli [Xinfang Regulations], supra note 7, arts. 3, 46. 
123 Minzner, supra note 8, at 103, 120–36, 151–58 (detailing the process for 
handling petitions). For a recent account of local government treatment of 
petitioners, see Shangfangzhe bei qiangguan jingshenbingyuan [Petitioners Forcibly 
Detained in Mental Institution], XIN JING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 8, 2008, available 
at  http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/dqzk/2008/12-08/008@021055.htm. 
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evaluations.  Chinese authorities have significantly increased the 
importance of mediation targets in recent years.124  Chinese courts 
and judges have responded to this pressure.  According to the 
SPC’s annual work reports, the ratio of cases resolved through 
mediation (as opposed to trial) has drastically shifted in the last 
four years.  The percentage of civil cases resolved through 
mediation rocketed from 31 percent (1.33 million cases) in 2004, to 
59 percent (3.17 million cases) in 2008—a 137 percent increase in 
the total number of cases closed through mediation in just four 
years.125  More striking still is the fact that almost the entire 
numerical shift appears to have taken place in a single year—
between 2006 and 2007!126  Chinese judges and legal scholars 
express concern that these numerical accomplishments (with some 
local courts reporting mediation rates of 99 percent) have been 
achieved at the expense of legal requirements of voluntariness in 
mediation, sacrificing parties’ rights and exacerbating social 
tensions.127 
Concerns regarding official use of performance targets are not 
limited to China.  Such targets, coupled with strict liability, 
generate concerns in other jurisdictions regarding the extent to 
which they impermissibly burden the independence of certain 
actors (such as judges) whose autonomous decision-making 
authority is valued.  In the 1970s, for example, U.S. Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) officials adopted a series of initiatives 
 
124 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
125 Compare Zui gao renmin fayuan 2005 nian gongzuo baogao [2005 Sup. 
People’s Ct. Work Report], issued 2005 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200503180013.htm (containing the relevant 
statistics for 2004), with Zui gao renmin fayuan 2009 nian gongzuo baogao [2009 
Sup. People’s Ct. Work Report], issued 2009 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/2009lh/content_1261101.htm (containing the corresponding 
statistics for 2008). 
126 Compare Zui gao renmin fayuan 2007 nian gongzuo baogao [2007 Sup. 
People’s Ct. Work Report], issued 2007 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=239089 (noting that 30.41% 
percent of civil cases were resolved through mediation, while 55.06 percent of 
first-instance civil cases were resolved through “mediation and withdrawal of the 
case”), with Zui gao renmin fayuan 2008 nian gongzuo baogao [2008 Sup. People’s 
Ct. Work Report], issued 2008 (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/newscenter/2008-03/22/content_7837838.htm (noting that 50.74% of civil cases 
were resolved by “mediation and withdrawal of the case”). 
127 Fayuan gao tiaojie jiean lv beihou de yinyou [Concerns Behind Courts High Rates 
of Case Closure Through Mediation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/0801/2009-06/11/content_1104238.htm (last 
visited June 09); Ai Jiahui, supra note 33, at 79–83. 
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targeting administrative law judges (“ALJs”) with low 
productivity rates or high reversal rates for targeted review and 
potentially adverse personnel actions.128  These efforts generated a 
firestorm of political and legal opposition among ALJs who felt 
that these efforts violated their guarantees of “decisional 
independence” under the Administrative Procedure Act.129  
American immigration authorities are currently experimenting 
with similar caseload requirements, and raising similar 
controversies.130 
Even if responsibility targets are not illegal themselves, and 
even if they do not incentivize unlawful behavior, they can still 
affect how local officials experience legal norms.  By reframing 
legal norms in terms of hard, numerical targets, backed up by 
strict, vicarious, and collective liability, responsibility systems 
sensitize officials to particular numerical outcomes rather than 
actual norms themselves.  Aims and goals expressed in national 
law that have not been reduced to hard targets, or are not capable 
of being so reduced, may fade in importance.  Put simply:  if you 
are a local Chinese official, do you care more about the vague 
language in the 2002 Law on Safe Production about worker rights, 
or do you care more about the annual worker death ratio in the 
particular responsibility system that governs your salary and 
career advancement? 
3.2. Interaction with Legal Norms:  No Clear Mechanism to Resolve 
Conflicts 
The relationship between law and responsibility systems is 
complicated by the absence of clear institutional mechanisms to 
iron out conflicts between the two. 
 
128 Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The 
Déjà vu of Decisional Disparity in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 493–4 
(2007). 
129  Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 676, 680–81 (2d Cir. 1989) (involving an 
appeal wherein the court upheld the SSA policies, but only because they did not 
apply a strict liability standard with regard to the failure of ALJs to “make target;” 
the court noted that the SSA policies did not “dictate the content of the decision” 
and found that “[a] minimum number of dispositions an ALJ must decide in a 
given period, provided this number is reasonable and not “etched in stone,” is not 
a prescription of how, or how quickly, an ALJ should decide a particular case”).  
130 See Shruti Rana, Streamlining the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice 
is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 829, 832 (arguing 
that the Department of Justice’s “streamlining” reforms are undermining judicial 
review). 
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First, consider the drafting process.  With respect to Party 
responsibility systems, the lack of clear institutional mechanisms 
for ensuring that they correspond with the law simply reflects the 
reality of the Chinese political system.  Party responsibility systems 
are a key element of one-party control.131  Responsibility for 
writing them rests with Party institutions, such as organization 
bureaus, rather than with the national and local legislatures that 
draft China’s laws, or the government agencies that enforce them.  
Differences can emerge intentionally, such as when publicly 
promulgated legal or constitutional norms (regarding the right of 
assembly) issued for propaganda purposes simply do not 
accurately reflect internal Party interests (regarding political 
control).  Differences can also emerge unintentionally, for example, 
when Party organization bureaus select court responsibility targets 
(mediation rates or appellate reversal ratios) for administrative 
convenience rather than for precise compliance with legal norms. 
But even with regard to run-of-the-mill responsibility systems 
used in administrative agencies, practical difficulties exist in 
ensuring that they are prepared in accordance with legal norms.  
Guttman and Song report that local environmental authorities 
(even in developed urban areas) lack both procedures and staff to 
evaluate whether pollution targets drafted for local responsibility 
systems actually comply with environmental law.132  Lack of 
transparency also hinders the ability of both the public and other 
government bureaus to provide input as to whether particular 
responsibility systems correspond with relevant law.  Some 
systems and targets are publicly available, but others are not.133 
Next, consider the institutional channels that exist for resolving 
conflicts in practice.  Imagine that you are an official who has been 
sanctioned by your bureau for failing to meet a responsibility 
target (perhaps a tax or birth control target) that would compel you 
(either directly or indirectly) to violate a higher-level legal or Party 
norm.  What recourse do you have?  Might you point out the 
inconsistency to your superiors and directly challenge the validity 
of the target?  Perhaps, but many local responsibility systems vest 
power to interpret their language with the same leadership group 
 
131 See Heimer, supra note 39, at 123–25 (discussing how the cadre 
responsibility system is used by central authorities to steer the bureaucracy). 
132 See Guttman & Song, supra note 46, at 424, 429. 
133 See id. at 429 (noting that environmental targets are not public in Beijing, 
except for the number of required clean air days). 
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that conducts evaluations and issues sanctions.134  Their 
evaluations of complaints regarding the validity of the sanctions 
they themselves have issued may be less than neutral.  One local 
court system hints at this problem, explicitly providing that court 
officials who continue to argue with the evaluation committee after 
it has made a decision to dock points under the applicable 100-
point scale will be subject to additional point deductions.135 
Limited channels of review exist in such cases—the court 
system is not an option.  The Law on Administrative Litigation 
specifically bars courts from reviewing decisions of administrative 
organs regarding personnel rewards or sanctions for their 
employees.136  The Law on Administrative Reconsideration 
expressly bars reconsideration of the validity of internal bureau 
regulations (guizhang).137  The Law on Civil Servants, the 
Regulations on Intra-Party Supervision, and the Party Charter do 
grant a limited right of review to aggrieved government employees 
or Party members subject to disciplinary sanctions.  They may 
request that the same government or Party entity that issued the 
disciplinary sanction, or its immediate superior, review the 
decision.138  But none of these permit review of the legality of the 
underlying responsibility targets on which the action is based. 
 
134 Zhenping System, supra note 61, art. 6(1); Yichun Municipal Housing 
Management Bureau, 2008 Work Target Evaluation Measures, issued Apr. 25, 
2008, arts. 4, 7 (P.R.C.), available at http://xxgk.gaoan.gov.cn/xxgk/fgj/xxgk 
/gzdt/zwdt/2008-08/200808061523388755.html; Tianjia’an District Court Work 
Target Evaluation Measures, Huainan City, issued Jan. 1, 2003, arts. 10, 12 
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.tjacourt.gov.cn/gaige/mubiaokaohe.htm. 
135 Zhenping System, supra note 61, art. 3(i). 
136 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa [Administrative 
Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April 
4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) 1989 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 
art. 12(2, 3) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp 
?id=1204. 
137 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng fuyi fa [Law on Administration 
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
April 29, 1999, effective April 29, 1999) 1999 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S 
CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre 
/laws-and-regulations/administration/administrative-reconsideration-law-of-
the-peoples-republic-of-china-1999.html. 
138 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongwuyuan fa [Law on Civil Servants] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April 27, 2005, 
effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2006 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.) 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2005-08/10/content 
_3333496.htm; Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei jiandu tiaoli (shixing) [CPC 
Regulations on Intra-Party Supervision] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
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Redressing problematic responsibility targets, either that create 
perverse practical incentives or that conflict with legal norms, 
ultimately depends on the willingness of particular higher-level 
authorities to expend political capital to push for changes in the 
content of local systems.139  Chinese central authorities regularly 
attempt to modify specific responsibility targets in order to address 
such problems that arise.  The SPC, for example, has made 
significant efforts to alter how local court responsibility systems 
discipline judges for cases deemed “incorrectly decided” (cuo’an).  
In 1998, the SPC issued two directives banning lower courts from 
mechanically sanctioning judges for any case reversed on appeal 
(on a strict liability basis), even if the error merely resulted from 
simple, non-negligent legal error.  The SPC directives also required 
courts to apply individualized liability for the misconduct of 
particular judges, instead of collectively or vicariously disciplining 
entire tribunals or court presidents.140 
The impact of the SPC directives has been mixed.  Some local 
courts, such as the intermediate-level appellate courts in Beijing, 
Guangzhou, and Kunming, have expressly amended their local 
responsibility systems to comply with the 1998 SPC directives.141  
 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb 17, 2004, effective Feb. 17, 2004) 2004 STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/newscenter/2005-01/16/content_2467829.htm; Zhongguo gongchandang dang 
zhangcheng, [Communist Party Charter], amended Nov. 14, 2002, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-11/18/content_633225.htm. 
139 This is reflected in the underlying language of the administration 
reconsideration law and the regulations governing the xinfang system, which 
allow Chinese citizens to bring petitions regarding official actions.  See Xinfang 
tiaoli [Xinfang Regulations], supra note 7, art. 32 (providing that xinfang bureaus 
should “support” (zhichi) petitions grounded in law, and “supervise and urge” 
(ducu) other bureaus to handle them); Law on Administration Reconsideration, 
issued Apr. 29, 1999, art. 27 (P.R.C.) (directing administrative reconsideration 
organs, if they find that the basis for a particular administrative action is illegal, to 
“handle” [chuli] it, or transfer it to another organ). 
140 Responsibility Measures, supra note 121; Renmin fayuan shenpan jilü 
chufen banfa (shixing) [Experimental Disciplinary Measures for Court Trials], 
issued Sept. 7, 1998 [hereinafter Disciplinary Measures], available at 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=395. 
141 Kunming shi zhongji renmin fayuan shenpan ting, heyi ting gongzuo 
guize (shixing) [Kunming Municipal Intermediate People’s Court Trial Tribunals, 
Collegiate Judicial Panels Work Principles (Provisional)], issued April 27, 2001, 
art. 31 (P.R.C.) [hereafter Kunming Principles]; Guangdong sheng gaoji renmin 
fayuan guanyu weifa shenpan zeren zhuijiu de zanxing banfa [Temporary 
Measures of the Guangdong Provincial HPC Regarding Responsibility for the 
Illegal Behavior of Court Personnel], issued August 30, 2000, art 8(1–3) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter Guangdong Measures], available at http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj 
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But in the ten years since 1998, other courts have implemented 
responsibility systems that openly violate the SPC directives by 
applying judicial sanctions based on strict, vicarious, and collective 
liability for cases reversed on appeal.142 
The SPC’s experience with disciplinary reform illustrates the 
extent to which core elements of responsibility systems—strict, 
vicarious, and collective liability tied to numerical work targets—
are institutionally embedded within the Chinese bureaucracy.  It 
also illustrates the difficulty that exists in resolving latent conflicts 
between responsibility systems and legal norms.  If China’s highest 
court experiences difficulty in altering such practices within their 
own bureaucratic hierarchy, and on subjects as mundane as judicial 
sanctions for ordinary appellate reversal, imagine the difficulties 
that exist in reforming responsibility target practices with regard to 
truly sensitive areas (such as petitioning). 
3.3. Negative Practical Effects 
Apart from their uneasy interaction with legal norms and 
institutions, responsibility systems also have a range of negative 
practical side effects for Chinese governance. 
First, heavy application of strict and vicarious liability to 
resolve principal-agent monitoring problems generates classic risks 
of “over control.”  Those on the receiving end of such sanctions 
may find themselves driven to take excessively harsh measures 
with regard to people they are expected to monitor in order to 
ward off their own liability.  For example, Title VII imposes 
vicarious liability on American employers for individual employee 
actions that create a “hostile work environment.”  Faced with this 
pressure, some employers defensively impose blanket controls on 
the speech of all employees.  This can result in excessively strict, 
zero-tolerance policies that infringe on legitimate employee 
interests in political and religious speech (e.g., banning a Goya 
painting from a university classroom).143  
 
/22/13989.html; Beijing shi di yi zhongji renmin fayuan shenpan renyuan weifa 
shenpan zeren zhuijiu shishi xize (shixing) [Implementation Details for the 
Responsibility System for Illegal (Behavior) of Trial Officers of the Beijing City 
First Intermediate People’s Court], issued Apr. 7, 1999, art. 8 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Beijing Details]. 
142 See Minzner, supra note 20, at 63 (discussing judicial sanctions in China). 
143 Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment 
Law Restrict? 85 GEO. L. J. 627, 642 & n.45 (1997). 
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The widespread imposition of strict and vicarious liability on 
Chinese Party or government leaders for the actions of their 
employees (or of local citizens) generates similar problems.  But the 
excesses involved are magnified by the absence of significant 
bottom-up electoral or legal constraints on official behavior.  Bobai 
county officials (discussed in the Introduction) faced strict and 
vicarious sanctions for failures to make birth control targets.  Faced 
with these pressures, they rationally (and brutally) decided to 
sacrifice villager interests and rights in a harsh coercive campaign.  
Party xinfang responsibility systems generate similar behavior.  
Concern over vicarious and strict liability resulting from citizen 
petitions to higher authorities leads local authorities to resort to 
extreme measures to control and suppress petitioners.144 
Second, reliance on collective and vicarious sanctions to govern 
contributes to another problem: the dangerous convergence of 
interests among local officials faced with sanctions.  The birth 
control and petitioning examples above illustrate one risk of such 
solidarity—the risk of local officials engaging in widespread 
collective conspiracies that violate clear central instructions (e.g., no 
coercive birth control measures, no retaliation against petitioners) 
in their efforts to fulfill responsibility targets set by higher 
authorities. 
If group members are collectively or vicariously subject to 
sanctions for the failings of a single member, they may also simply 
decide to cooperate in concealing misbehavior or compliance failure 
from higher authorities.145  Local Chinese governance is rife with 
examples.  As Zhao Shukai notes, municipal, county, township, 
and village authorities collude to defeat birth control inspections 
by provincial-level leaders.  County, township, and village officials 
conspire to thwart municipal efforts.146  Ironically, the reliance of 
central Chinese authorities on collective and vicarious sanctions 
itself helps create the problematic unity of interests among local 
officials—the very source of Beijing’s enforcement problems. 
 
144 See Minzner, supra note 8, at 154–55 (describing harsh methods employed 
by local authorities as a result of xinfang responsibility systems, including 
interrogations and arbitrary barring of suspected petitioners attempting to 
purchase railway tickets, and instances of violent suppression of petitioners). 
145 Cf. Levinson, supra note 105, at 388–91 (discussing this same phenomena 
with regard to the frankpledge system in medieval England, in which ten-person 
groups devoted particular effort to cover up crimes committed by group members 
rather than reporting them). 
146 See Zhao, supra note 82, at 248. 
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Third, responsibility systems contribute to selective and 
distorted policy implementation.  As Whiting notes, the 
combination of specific performance targets and high financial 
incentives in cadre responsibility systems creates moral hazard 
problems.  Local Chinese authorities “game the system” by 
engaging in undesirable behavior to optimize outcomes with 
respect to certain target goals.147  They have strong incentives to 
focus solely on high-value targets designated as “priority targets 
with veto power” (yipiao fojue) that are easily quantifiable and 
subject to measurement.  They have similarly strong incentives to 
overlook other, lower-value targets that are not so easily measured, 
or to overlook legal responsibilities that are not factored into their 
evaluations.148  Consequently, as O’Brien and Li have found, local 
officials pay significant attention to meeting (or creating the 
appearance of meeting) social protest, birth control, and revenue 
targets, while disregarding targets such as respecting villagers’ 
autonomy or limiting peasants’ burden.149 
These negative effects are amplified when coupled with other 
personnel practices, such as the cadre rotation system.  Local Party 
officials are regularly rotated among positions across the nation.  
This theoretically limits their ability to develop local power bases 
and ensures that their interests (and loyalties) remain tied to the 
bureaucratic apparatus rather than the people they govern in any 
particular jurisdiction.  However, it also generates negative side 
effects.  Faced with limited time in a given office and strong 
pressure to demonstrate “success” to their superiors on high-value, 
easily measurable targets, some local Party cadres sacrifice the 
long-term interests of their jurisdictions in favor of short-term 
“show” projects.  Indeed, responsibility systems that strongly 
emphasized economic growth targets in the 1980s and 1990s 
spurred many local Party cadres into initiating crash economic 
development programs without considering long-term 
 
147 See Whiting, supra note 10, at 112–15 (noting that assignment of “output 
value” as a key performance indicator resulted in local cadres supporting 
gratuitous economic expansion, without considering the efficiency of production 
processes or market demand for products). 
148 Id. at 112–15; see also O’Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 173–75 (noting that 
policies that have quantifiable output tend to drive out policies that do not, 
despite the fact that the latter policies are just as important). 
149 O’Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 174.  See also supra Section 2.2. and 
accompanying text. 
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consequences.150  O’Brien and Li note that one Henan county 
leader ordered every village in his jurisdiction to set up a paper 
mill within a year.  Some one hundred paper mills were built and 
the county leader received a promotion on the basis of his 
economic accomplishments, but when the mills went bankrupt, 
and their environmental consequences became clear, the county 
leader had already been rotated to another county, presumably 
having reaped the career benefits of his earlier “successes.”151 
Fourth, responsibility systems contribute to the 
“mistranslation” of central norms.  As discussed earlier, 
responsibility systems play an important role in “operationalizing” 
vague central mandates.  They transform central orders into 
concrete directives that can be carried out by local officials and 
monitored by their superiors.152  But this process invariably alters 
the underlying content of the original instructions from above. 
The population planning directive in the introduction provides 
one such example.  The central order set forth clear, broad goals: 
greater adherence to population planning rules, no forced 
abortions.  This order subsequently filtered down through various 
levels in the bureaucratic chain of command.  But when it emerged 
in concrete form in the Bobai county responsibility system, nothing 
remained but hard revenue figures and numbers of people to be 
swept up in the campaign, coupled with a feeble order to distribute 
the central directive in an educational campaign.  Faced with these 
pressures, local township authorities rationally resorted to coercive 
measures that violated the original intent of the central orders. 
Recent central efforts regarding rural health reform provide a 
second example.  On March 17, 2009, central Party and state 
officials issued a joint opinion calling for improvements in health 
infrastructure.  The opinion specifically called for local authorities 
to “establish medical health centers in every township, and 
undertake different measures to support the construction of village 
health clinics, enabling each administrative village to have a village 
health clinic, increasing and improving village medical and health 
conditions, and improving service quality.”153  The central order 
 
150 See Whiting, supra note 10, at 112–15 (describing long-term dysfunctional 
outcomes of local authorities “gaming the system”). 
151 O’Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 176. 
152 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
153 Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua yiyao weisheng 
tizhi gaige de yijian [Opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
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prompted a flurry of activity among local authorities seeking to 
demonstrate their compliance.  In April, the Xinyang municipal 
Party secretary announced that a village health clinic would be 
built in each of the municipality’s 3,042 administrative villages 
within eight months.  Each health clinic was expected to use 
exactly the same building design and floor plan.  Designating this 
as a “priority target with veto power” (yipiao fojue), the municipal 
Party secretary issued an order stating that township party 
secretaries who failed to make this target would be relieved of their 
posts.  Township officials subsequently leaped into action, 
requiring village medical workers to construct or remodel their 
health clinics in accordance with the pre-approved blueprints as a 
condition of continuing to practice medicine.154 
These targets generated resistance.  Village medical workers in 
one county noted that the proposed plan would require the 
abandonment of a large number of recently constructed health 
clinics (some one-third of the clinics in the county)—clinics that 
met provincial standards but did not correspond to the chosen 
municipal floor plan.  Noting that the plan would only reimburse 
one-quarter the cost of building the clinics, many village medical 
workers also asserted that they would have to abandon medicine 
rather than comply with the building requirements, leaving their 
villages without practicing medical personnel.  Expressing doubt 
that they could actually fulfill the requirements, dozens of other 
workers nonetheless signed responsibility agreements with 
township officials, promising to construct the required clinics by 
the end of September.155 
Note that in both examples described above, the process of 
translating the original central directive (strengthen population 
planning work, improve rural health work) into specific 
responsibility targets (ensuring that a specified number of women 
have tubal ligations, building a precisely defined structure by a 
precisely defined date) effectively generated pressures (forced 
 
and the State Council Regarding Deepening Reform to the Drug and Health 
Systems], issued Mar. 17, 2009 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg 
/2009-04/06/content_1278721.htm. 
154 Xinyang tui “bieshu weishengshi” ling cunyi xian kunjing [Xinyang Effort to 
Promote ‘Villa-Style Medical Clinics” Places Village Doctors in a Difficult Position], XIN 
JING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], June 11, 2009 [hereinafter Village Doctors]. 
155 Id. 
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abortions, encouraging medical personnel to leave the profession) 
that contravened the intent of the original central orders. 
Why does this happen? 
Two possible answers present themselves immediately.  The 
local Chinese officials in question might just be very incompetent.  
Their selection of particular targets might reflect crude work 
attitudes or an inability to fully comprehend (and implement) the 
rarified goals of central policies.  Alternatively, central Chinese 
officials might be engaged in a conspiracy of silence.  They might 
fully intend for policies regarding birth control or petitioners to be 
brutally implemented.  Under this interpretation, language in 
central directives (such as language that bars coercive birth control 
measures) is nothing but “window dressing,” to be ignored by 
local authorities or countermanded by secret instructions from 
central officials that reflect their “real” interests. 
There is some truth behind each explanation.  Incompetent 
officials cause policy mis-implementation in every country.  Some 
targets are explicitly chosen (and concealed) for authoritarian 
political purposes.  However, these explanations do not fully 
suffice.  Not all instances of policy mis-implementation reflect 
pervasive stupidity on the part of local officials, and the center 
certainly does not affirmatively intend for local authorities to 
engage in economic development or rural health plans that waste 
central resources. 
This leaves room for a third explanation.  At a deeper 
institutional level, the process of transmitting directives within the 
Chinese bureaucracy actually alters the underlying content.  
Central Party and government officials issue broad instructions to 
local authorities such as “follow the law” or “represent interests of 
residents in your jurisdiction” as part of promulgating new policies 
aimed at environmental conservation or economic development.  
But local officials in Party organizational bureaus or county 
governments do not enjoy the luxury of incorporating these same 
principles in the responsibility systems they draft to implement the 
central will.  Such standards are too difficult to monitor.  They also 
run the risk of creating independent standards (popular 
satisfaction, legal norms) that conflict with core principles of 
Leninist one-party rule.  Consequently, Chinese responsibility 
systems are drawn to translating central directives into numerical 
targets.  They are particularly drawn to targets that can be checked 
up on.  Ordering every local village to build a clinic with exactly 
the same floor plan by a particular date makes sense from this 
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perspective—Party or government officials can theoretically 
inspect a village clinic to see if it is in compliance.  They cannot do 
that with broad instructions to “improve village health.”156 
Distortion can be conceived in other terms as well.  
Transmission of higher-level directives down through the Chinese 
bureaucracy resembles the children’s game of “telephone,” in 
which a child whispers a phrase in the ear of another, in sequence.  
Just as the original spoken sentence becomes twisted as it makes its 
way from child to child, the express content of central instructions 
becomes distorted as they descend through the bureaucratic 
hierarchy.  The relatively closed Chinese political system (like the 
closed nature of children’s communication in the game of 
“telephone”) contributes to this.  Lack of governmental 
transparency, restricted channels for political participation by 
citizens, and lack of judicial channels to challenge responsibility 
systems that violate central norms mean that citizens (and other 
officials) are often unable to “shout out” when central norms 
become distorted at a particular step during the process of 
reducing them to concrete responsibility targets.157  Complex 
shades are lost; nuances degrade.  What gets remembered (and 
repeated) are clear, hard numbers and instructions (“no petitioners 
to Beijing in the next year”). 
This fourth point differs somewhat from those made in the 
policy mis-implementation literature discussed above.  Particular 
responsibility systems and targets do create perverse incentives 
that twist the behavior of local officials.  However, part of the 
reason why these targets are selected reflects an institutional 
problem facing the Chinese system, a problem much deeper than 
nonsensical or authoritarian targets chosen by individual leaders.  
The nature of responsibility systems locks Chinese authorities into 
expressing themselves in particular ways (reversed case ratios, 
mediation targets, etc.) that may not fully correspond with original 
central wishes.  Further, the process of transmitting norms between 
levels within the system and generating responsibility systems 
 
156 Similarly, responsibility systems are drawn toward enforcing targets 
through strict or vicarious liability, such as suspending the licenses of local 
doctors for failing to meet particular targets. 
157 Naturally, some channels do exist for the airing of problematic targets.  
See, e.g., Village Doctors, supra note 154 (illustrating the ability of one independent-
leaning Beijing publication to expose problematic targets). 
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inherently introduces a degree of “information decay” that ensures 
the responsibility systems can not fully reflect central intentions. 
Finally, excessive reliance on top-down responsibility systems 
risks undermining official Chinese efforts to develop stable 
institutions of governance.  For officials and citizens alike, targets 
and their liability regimes matter.  This is not necessarily true for 
institutions in which the targets are embedded.  At least in some 
cases, formal legal institutions and procedures devolve into a 
shadow puppet show around which the real game of responsibility 
targets plays itself out. 
What happens to officials?  Judges become sensitized to 
mediation rates.  Administrators become sensitized to numbers of 
mine explosions or traffic accidents.  Party and government 
officials become sensitized to numbers of petitions, particularly 
mass petitions.  Faced with this pressure, procedural norms (e.g., 
requirements of voluntariness in mediation) and substantive 
considerations (e.g., legal merit of petitioners’ complaints) erode 
and give way. 
Citizens have similar experiences.  They find that relying on 
formal norms and procedures governing state institutions is of 
limited value in resolving their grievances.  They learn that 
responsibility targets offer a more direct button to push in their 
effort to trigger a state reaction.  Disgruntled parties discover that 
threatening to mount a mass petition or disseminating 
inflammatory (or false) information on the Internet provides more 
effective levers with which to force officials to heel, rather than 
proceeding step-by-step through the legal machinery of 
administrative reconsideration or litigation.158 
This complex state-society relationship has a corrosive effect on 
institutions.  It erodes the authority of the courts, encourages 
citizens to escalate their grievances in the streets, and breeds a 
strongly reactive outlook on the part of officials, who find 
themselves driven to respond to the external manifestations of 
underlying problems rather than their roots. 
 
 
 
 
158 See generally Minzner, supra note 8 (examining the ways in which the 
xinfang system creates problematic behavioral incentives for citizen petitioners). 
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3.4. Summary 
This leads to the second central argument of this paper.  
Chinese leaders’ existing strategy for addressing the principal-
agent problems at the heart of the Chinese bureaucracy is itself the 
cause of many governance problems that they seek to address.  
Central reliance on top-down application of strict, collective, and 
vicarious liability linked to responsibility targets as a tool to govern 
their local agents incentivizes problematic behavior on the part of 
local officials, particularly in the absence of effective bottom-up 
institutional channels for citizens to participate politically or 
resolve their grievances.  While these strategies do allow central 
Party authorities some degree of control over local officials in the 
short-term, they have a destructive long-term impact on Chinese 
society and governance, undermining efforts of central Chinese 
authorities to effectively monitor and supervise their subordinates. 
4. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
This Article offers several new perspectives on Chinese law 
and governance.  It deepens our understanding of how the Chinese 
legal and political systems operate.  It also helps explain recent 
domestic political choices made by central leaders, raises important 
questions regarding the future impact of these choices on the legal 
system, and provides practical suggestions for advancing legal 
reform in China. 
4.1. Responsibility Systems: A Core Element of Chinese Law and 
Governance 
First, this Article identifies the key functional role of Chinese 
cadre responsibility systems.  Central leaders face pervasive 
principal-agent problems in governing China.  Cadre responsibility 
systems’ application of strict, collective, and vicarious liability for 
success or failure in reaching target goals is an institutional 
response to these problems.  These measures bear some 
resemblance to those adopted by other legal systems confronted 
with principal-agent problems in particular fields.  American 
administrative law scholars seeking to explore the utility of 
collective or vicarious sanctions as a mechanism to control 
bureaucratic behavior might find that internal Chinese Party and 
state practices offer a fertile field for comparative analysis. 
Responsibility systems based on strict, collective, and vicarious 
liability principles are not simply post-1949 inventions of Party 
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authorities.  Their roots stretch much further back in Chinese 
imperial history.159  This Article, however, does not argue that these 
elements of responsibility systems are rooted in Chinese culture.  
Rather, their continuity exists because the underlying institutional 
problem facing Chinese leaders has remained the same across both 
the imperial and modern periods.  Chinese central authorities lack 
effective channels to monitor and evaluate the actions of their local 
agents.  They remain highly uncomfortable with allowing the 
development of bottom-up institutional channels that could help to 
monitor and check local authorities, precisely because they fear 
these channels might develop to limit the power of the emperor or 
central Party officials as well.  Faced with these problems, top-
down responsibility systems tied to the personnel apparatus 
remain the preferred governance tool for a bureaucratic and 
authoritarian Chinese state. 
Second, this Article challenges several prevailing assumptions 
regarding China.  The Chinese legal and political systems are 
characterized by a wide gap between the way things are supposed 
to work (“law on the books”) and the way they actually do (“law in 
practice”).  Central laws or directives emphasize rigorous 
enforcement of intellectual property or environmental protection 
norms.  But actual implementation of these policies by local 
officials can range from spotty to non-existent.  National 
institutions issue formal laws or regulations that create institutions 
(such as courts) to handle citizen grievances.  But many citizens 
choose to bypass these institutions in favor of less formal ones 
(such as direct petitioning of higher-level authorities). 
Confronted with this disconnect, observers often find 
themselves resorting to one of two explanations.  Some point to 
cultural or educational factors.  Under this view, the reason that 
local officials fail to implement central policies (or violate them) is 
because the officials are uneducated or lack a proper 
understanding of the law.160  Rural citizens allegedly fail to use 
 
159 A separate work currently in progress by this author traces these efforts 
back to core principles of Legalist philosophy and Qin (221–206 BCE) dynastic 
practices. 
160 For example, some argue that Chinese judges’ lack of legal education 
leads them to misunderstand how law or the judicial system “should” operate.  
See, e.g., Faguan suzhi di zhiyue zhifa shuiping [Low Quality of Judges Constrains 
the Quality of Execution Work of Legal Judgments], SOUTHCN, July 7, 2002, 
available at http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/gdtodayimportant 
/200207191435.htm. 
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legal institutions for the same reasons.161  These views are 
frequently expressed in dismissive comments that the “quality” of 
local officials or citizens is simply too low (suzhi tai di) to appreciate 
how central policies are supposed to work. 
Other observers rely on a vague “external Party interference” 
rubric to explain the gap between the law on the books and the 
way things work in practice.  This view paints a picture of a hazy 
and monolithic institution called “the Party” that interferes with 
the legal system in a heavy-handed manner.  It issues broad 
political directives that expand or contract room for legal reforms.  
It directly intervenes to ensure the arrests and convictions of 
political dissidents.  And it violates legal and constitutional norms 
with periodic political campaigns that shutter newspapers or close 
internet chat-rooms.162 
This Article suggests that both descriptions are incomplete.   
Not all local Chinese officials are uneducated simpletons, wildly 
pursuing nonsensical policies.  Rather, many are highly rational 
actors responding to specific incentive structures created by local 
responsibility systems.  Heavy emphasis by local courts on 
mediation, abusive birth control enforcement campaigns by some 
local authorities, and the lack of attention by local officials to 
national environmental laws and policies do not reflect a lack of 
legal consciousness by local authorities.  Nor do they reflect an 
ignorance of the “modern rules of the game.”  If anything, they 
often reflect the opposite—an acute and finely-tuned sensitivity on 
the part of local authorities towards fulfilling (or appearing to 
fulfill) the particular performance criteria they face under local 
responsibility systems. 
Attention to the incentives established by responsibility 
systems can help explain actions of particular Chinese legal actors 
that can be difficult to understand at first glance. For example, 
comprehensive works on Chinese law note in passing the common 
resort by lower courts to an ill-defined qingshi system to solicit the 
views of higher courts and judges regarding how to decide 
pending cases (and avoid appellate reversal).  But they do not fully 
 
161 Another expression of this view comes in the form of arguments that 
traditional Confucian views contribute to citizen distrust of courts and the legal 
system.  See, e.g., QING-YUN JIANG, COURT DELAY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 
24–25 (2006), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content 
/n1uh6614n46122u1. 
162 Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N. Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at A1. 
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explain the reasons motivating Chinese courts and judges to rely 
on qingshi requests, particularly in light of express SPC efforts to 
curtail such practices. 163  In contrast, an examination of local court 
responsibility systems, particularly the disciplinary sanctions that 
they mete out to judges for incorrectly decided cases reversed on 
appeal, helps illuminate the underlying incentives motivating such 
behavior. 
This Article also suggests the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of the Party’s role in the Chinese system.  True, 
Party authorities do make broad policy decisions regarding how 
China is run.  They also clearly retain the power to intervene in 
specific instances, such as cases involving dissidents.  But an even 
more significant and underappreciated source of Party influence 
on the legal system arises from the role of Party organization 
bureaus and committees in setting particular performance targets 
for judges and other officials, and deciding whether judges and 
officials have fulfilled them. 
Third, this analysis suggests that the academic study of 
Chinese law may need to shift in focus.  Modern research into 
Chinese law has, until recently, tended to emphasize formal legal 
norms enunciated by judicial bodies such as the SPC and 
legislative entities such as the NPC.  This is because these 
institutions have become important since 1978.  As central Party 
authorities have strategically pulled back from routine governance 
matters, the SPC and NPC have acquired significant 
responsibilities over adjudication and law-making.  Others reasons 
exist as well.  These institutions resemble what many Westerners 
think legal institutions “should” look like.  Chinese legislative and 
judicial leaders employ terminology and concepts familiar to 
American legal academics.  Many have studied in the United States 
or in other countries.  They are natural subjects of study. 
 
163 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO THE RULE OF LAW 314–
15 (2002) (generally describing the undue influence higher courts exert on lower 
courts in China); see also Zhao Shuping, Woguo fayuan zai juti anjian shang shiyong 
falu de qingshi yu pifu de lixing sikao [Thoughts on Chinese Court Use of Qingshi 
Requests and Replies in the Application of Law in Concrete Cases], J. HUNAN PUB. SEC. 
COLL. 35, 36 (2004).  In contrast, the link between qingshi and court disciplinary 
treatment is noted in the CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 
78–81 (2d Sess. 2004); see also Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on 
Independent Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 
77, 104–05 (2004). 
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But this analytical lens is too simplistic.  It ignores how the 
Chinese bureaucracy actually works, overlooking the core role that 
Party institutions continue to play in interpreting abstract 
behavioral norms and setting concrete incentives for officials.  This 
analytical lens also misses the extent to which the Party-
administered personnel system is a key component of the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian institutional framework that has run 
China for the past two thousand years.  Simply because foreign 
observers are not accustomed to viewing central Party circulars, 
the Party Organization Department, and local responsibility 
systems as “legal” in nature—and because some may have 
normative reactions against doing so—we may be missing some of 
the key institutions that actually interpret, operationalize, and 
implement Chinese legal norms.  This bias is not limited to 
Western observers.  Prominent Chinese legal scholars note the 
same tendency within Chinese academia to overlook the role of 
institutions, such as Party responsibility systems, because they do 
not correspond to an idealized view of what law “should” look 
like.164 
Some scholars explicitly recognize this disconnect.  A growing 
number of political scientists and sociologists regularly cross the 
border between law and administration in analyzing how the 
Chinese state actually operates.165  This realization is spreading in 
legal academia as well.  In 2003, Donald Clarke warned against 
simplistic and superficial comparisons between Chinese and 
foreign institutions (specifically between the NPC and the US 
Congress, or between the formal administrative legal norms of 
both countries) without taking into account the deep political and 
structural differences of how the two countries actually operate.166  
A few legal scholars explicitly analyze Party institutions and 
directives alongside their formal legal counterparts, for example, as 
Ben Liebman did in his comprehensive study of the Chinese 
 
164 Interview with Zhu Suli, Dean, Beijing University Law School (June 27, 
2008) (on file with author); Interview with He Weifang, Professor, Beijing 
University Law School (Aug. 4, 2008) (on file with author). 
165 See, for example, the works of Kevin O’Brien, Susan Whiting, and Andrew 
Mertha in the field of political science, and Ethan Michelson and Sida Liu in the 
field of sociology. 
166 Donald C. Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When is a Riddle 
Just a Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM, 93–121 (Stephen Hsu 
ed., 2003). 
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media.167  However, this is still far from mainstream practice.  
Foreign scholarship on the Chinese legal system is still replete with 
articles that merely take the text of some recently promulgated 
Chinese statute, and then analyze it in isolation or simply 
juxtapose it with corresponding Western statutes.168 
What direction should the study of Chinese law take?  The 
relevant field of vision must continue to broaden.  It needs to 
accurately correspond with the integrated concept of zhengfa 
(politics and law) employed by Chinese Party officials.  In China, 
national laws, such as the 2007 Property Law, are often preceded 
by both draft legal opinions of scholars and broad Party directives 
giving general policy guidance.  It is an environment where those 
laws are implemented locally by both formal government 
regulations and official Party instructions.  Furthermore, those 
laws, once implemented, are often the target of citizen petitioning 
efforts that employ both legal rhetoric and Party slogans in an 
effort to change them.  In light of this, it does not make sense to 
separate the study of “law” from the study of “Party directives.” 
Legal analysis must therefore be adapted to the study of Party 
documents and institutions.  Legal scholars are accustomed to 
using textual and comparative analyses to dissect government 
rules and regulations.  Why not use those high-powered tools on 
the mass of Party documents that set out norms of behavior for 
Party and government officials?  Many of these are openly 
available in one form or another on Party and government 
websites.  This would give legal scholars a much more nuanced 
and accurate view of how legal and bureaucratic norms are 
actually interpreted and implemented. 
What would this mean in practice?  Think about how one 
might draft a textbook on Chinese law.  You are trying to explain 
to a student how rules governing the behavior of Chinese officials 
and citizens are actually made and implemented.  Should you 
write something like an American or European textbook, setting 
 
167 See Liebman, supra note 86, at 14–59 (analyzing the interaction between 
the Chinese media, legal system, and Party institutions). 
168 See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: 
Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 379 (2009) (analyzing 
China’s new Antimonopoly Law); C. Stephen Hsu, Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 115 (2007) (describing the doctrinal structure 
of the new Contract Law); Aashish Srivastava, No Rice, No Wife to Cook: An 
Analysis of the Electronic Signatures Law of China, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 437 
(2005) (providing an overview of the PRC Electronic Signatures Law). 
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forth constitutional provisions and statutes, followed by 
interpretative regulations and cases?  Or should you proceed by 
choosing a sweeping central Party directive—for example, a central 
circular on “harmonious society”—identifying the formal legal and 
regulatory changes that follow in its wake, then analyzing the 
specific Party and administrative personnel responsibility systems 
that implement these changes through the Chinese bureaucratic 
apparatus?  Or should you adopt a side-by-side approach, 
devoting half the book to the norms and procedures of the 
National People’s Congress and Supreme People’s Court, and the 
other half to those of the Central Party Committee, Organization 
Bureau, and Disciplinary Inspection Committee?  Either of the 
latter two options would present a more realistic representation of 
how China actually operates.169 
4.2. Responsibility Systems:  A Necessary Target for Chinese Legal 
Reformers 
Appreciating the role of responsibility systems is not merely a 
question of improving our academic understanding of how China 
operates.  It also helps to identify both practical problems in local 
Chinese governance, as well as potential solutions. 
Excessive reliance by central authorities on Party-led 
responsibility systems to govern generates serious conflicts with 
the Chinese legal system.  This is partly a result of the content of 
many of these systems, which reflect the interests of a one-Party 
political system, with strong emphasis on maintaining tight social 
control.  Requiring officials to meet strict (and high) targets for 
judicial convictions or similar (low) numbers of permissible mass 
citizen petitions unavoidably generates conflict with purported 
legal protections for citizen rights.  But conflict also arises because 
of the general disconnect between the process by which 
responsibility systems are established and those by which legal 
norms are adopted.  There is simply no institutional guarantee that 
these two mesh. 
Excessive reliance on top-down responsibility systems also 
fuels a range of practical governance problems.  Widespread 
application of collective and vicarious liability strengthens 
 
169 Naturally, examining formal Party documents, even in conjunction with 
formal legal ones, is still insufficient to understand how things actually work in 
practice.  There will always be a gap between de jure institutional norms (whether 
legal or Party) and de facto practice. 
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destructive convergences of interests among local officials, and can 
facilitate their efforts to conceal governance failures from central 
officials.  Extensive reliance on strict liability for success or failure 
in meeting responsibility targets sensitizes local officials to making 
particular numerical goals, contributing to policy mis-
implementation among local officials. 
How does one resolve these problems?  One answer is to alter 
the concrete incentives that cadre responsibility systems create for 
local authorities.  Simply relying on formal laws and regulations 
issued by institutions such as the SPC, NPC, and State Council is 
insufficient.  No number of well-meaning central policy 
statements, national laws, or official speeches will suffice to reduce 
the repressive tactics employed by local officials against citizen 
petitioners, as long as local responsibility systems continue to 
make the numbers of petitions one of the most important factors in 
assessing local Party officials’ work.170  Similarly, SPC efforts to 
reduce qingshi requests to higher courts will not be successful 
absent comprehensive measures to alter the incentives present in 
local court responsibility systems that push local judges to resort to 
such practices in the first place. 
What does this mean practically for domestic and foreign 
organizations interested in pursuing legal reform in China?  The 
focus cannot just be on drafting national laws.  Rather, it must 
include the concrete criteria by which officials are evaluated.  Do 
not limit your cooperative programs to the National People’s 
Congress and other legislative bodies.  Rather, try to ensure that 
representatives from the Party organization bureau attend your 
conferences as well.  Encourage them to talk to the attendees from 
the legal affairs offices of the local people’s congresses.  Work to 
ensure that internal Party personnel norms reflect the same 
standards as publicly promulgated legal ones. 
But if central Chinese officials are really interested in 
addressing some of the fundamental problems in local Chinese 
governance, merely tinkering with specific criteria used to evaluate 
local Chinese officials may be insufficient.  Instead, officials need to 
come up with a better institutional response to the principal-agent 
problem at the heart of Chinese governance.  This requires 
structural political and legal reforms.  It requires independent 
bottom-up channels for citizens to redress their grievances, check 
 
170 See Minzner, supra note 8, at 151–58 (describing xinfang responsibility 
systems, the incentives they establish, and their effects). 
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government misconduct, and participate in the decisions that affect 
their lives.  What form this takes—whether modified versions of 
Western-style courts, Party disciplinary commissions, or even the 
imperial Chinese censorate—is not important.  The function of 
these reforms is. 
Foreign and domestic activists seeking to advance these kinds 
of reforms in China, may want to tone down their normative 
arguments.  Rights-based arguments, invocations of international 
legal norms, or negative comparisons of Chinese practices may be 
useful if activists are trying to mobilize domestic and international 
public opinion to condemn China.  But the willingness of outside 
actors to resort to such strategies is rapidly weakening in a world 
where foreign governments increasingly find official Chinese 
cooperation essential in handling issues such as North Korea, 
international nuclear proliferation, and global financial stability.  
Moreover, the effectiveness of relying on such strategies alone is 
questionable.  Moralistic lecturing by Westerners can generate a 
nationalistic backlash among the domestic Chinese public.  It can 
also lead to Chinese cynicism about foreign motives when Western 
governments sacrifice (or use) their own principles for concrete 
political purposes.  Finally, Chinese Party authorities focused on 
maintaining their own political power simply are not that likely to 
be moved by normative arguments about what they should or 
should not do. 
This Article, however, does provide activists another arrow in 
their quiver of strategies to promote political and legal reform in 
China.  It provides a dispassionate argument that Chinese leaders’ 
own governance practices are undermining the stability of their 
country, and that addressing this problem is in the interests of 
central authorities themselves.  Naturally, not all will heed this call.  
However, it may resonate with those Chinese officials and citizens 
who are seriously concerned with the future of their country.  It 
also allows outsiders who seek to raise issues of domestic Chinese 
political reform an alternative vehicle that contrasts favorably to 
the two strategies commonly pursued:  confrontational normative 
moralizing and active avoidance of the issues. 
This Article’s argument that the underlying problem and 
solutions facing China are institutional in nature may help limit the 
possibility of a nationalist backlash to calls for political reform.  
China does not need to adopt Western political culture, values, or 
systems.  Rather, it needs domestically-generated political reform 
plans that address the institutional principal-agent problem at the 
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heart of Chinese politics, that order to open up bottom-up legal 
and political channels, and that adequately respond to the needs of 
Chinese citizens themselves. 
 
4.3. A Turn Away From Legal Institutions in Favor of Responsibility 
Systems? 
Many Chinese authorities already recognize the problems that 
result from exclusively relying on top-down monitoring strategies 
to control their local agents.171  Over the last two decades, Chinese 
authorities have consequently allowed legal institutions to emerge 
as limited bottom-up fora providing popular input into—and 
supervision of—local government.  The Administrative Litigation 
Law, Administrative Licensing Law, and Regulations on Open 
Government Information have opened channels for ordinary 
citizens to contest and challenge actions of local officials.172  The 
role of national and local legislatures in policy-making has 
increased.  Authorities have experimented with holding public 
hearings and soliciting academic and citizen input on draft laws 
and regulations. 
The aim of these efforts is better resolution of the age-old 
principal-agent problem at the core of Chinese governance.  
Bottom-up citizen supervision of local officials aids central 
authorities.  It helps address information gaps.  Local officials can 
easily hide ongoing corruption from central work teams that drop 
in only periodically.  It is much more difficult for them to conceal 
misbehavior from the tens of thousands of residents living in their 
jurisdiction.  By allowing citizens to bring administrative lawsuits, 
central authorities can essentially “deputize” the public at large to 
monitor local officials’ compliance with national laws.  Increased 
citizen input into the policy-making process through legislative or 
administrative hearings provides similar benefits.  It helps ensure 
that local plans implementing education, environmental, or 
economic development policies are not simply drafted to respond 
 
171 O’Brien & Li, supra note 28, at 176–181. 
172 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa [Law on 
Administrative Litigation], issued Apr. 4, 1989 (P.R.C.); Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo xingzheng xuke fa [Law on Administrative Licensing], issued Aug. 27, 
2003 (P.R.C.); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkao tiaoli 
[Regulations on Open Government Information], issued May 1, 2008 (P.R.C.). 
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to the interests of a select few who happen to have the ear of local 
officials. 
Chinese citizens have actively used the increased space 
provided by these central reforms.  Over the last decade, the ranks 
of Chinese public interest lawyers and activists have swelled.  They 
have used China’s laws and regulations to challenge a range of 
local government actions.  These involve issues ranging from 
environmental pollution173 to hepatitis discrimination174 to electoral 
fraud.175  In 2003, following the death of a young migrant named 
Sun Zhigang in police custody, legal activists even targeted a 
national-level policy: a controversial—and extralegal—form of 
administrative detention known “custody and repatriation” (C&R).  
Buoyed by a wave of public outrage and media coverage 
surrounding Sun’s death, legal activists petitioned national 
authorities, challenging the constitutional and legal basis of the 
regulations governing the C&R system.  Central authorities 
avoided the more controversial elements of the petitions, such as 
calls for China’s national legislature to exercise its constitutional 
and legal authority to supervise the actions of the executive branch 
of government, the State Council.  However, Chinese authorities 
did take concrete steps to appease public anger.  Less than two 
months after the story surrounding Sun’s death broke in the 
national media, the State Council itself announced the withdrawal 
of the C&R regulations, replacing them with a system of voluntary 
aid stations for vagrants and beggars.176 
Some Chinese authorities are growing uncomfortable with the 
energies they have unleashed.  Central officials are certainly 
 
173 The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims is a non-
governmental environmental protection organization established in China in 
1998.  Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, http://www.clapv.org 
/new/en/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
174 See Chen Qian, Hepatitis-B Carriers Win Right to Attend School, SHANGHAI 
DAILY, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2008 
/200811/20081121/article_381528.htm (discussing activists’ use of the legal 
system to guarantee the right of Hepatitis-B carriers to attend school). 
175 See EastSouthWestNorth: The Tashi (China) Elections—Part I 
(Chronology), http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050919_1.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 
2009) (discussing a 2005 recall campaign mounted by residents in Taishi village 
against their village committee head). 
176 For an excellent analysis of the Sun Zhigang incident, see Keith J. Hand, 
Using Law For a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of 
Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114 
(2006). 
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interested in seeing legal institutions and citizen participation 
develop as effective tools to assist national Party authorities in  
managing and controlling an unruly bureaucracy.  However, they 
do not want these tools evolving into independent checks on Party 
power.177  They also most certainly do not want to see China’s legal 
activists developing into a force for organizing the discontented, 
launching thinly veiled political challenges to Party power.  
Chinese officials have responded in a variety of ways.  These range 
from garden-variety harassment of public interest lawyers 
representing clients in high-profile cases,178 to issuance of broad 
directives requiring lawyers representing clients in mass cases to 
accept government supervision and guidance,179 to promulgating 
internal directives that explicitly bar courts from handling 
particular types of cases.180 
In the spring of 2008, Chinese authorities escalated these 
efforts.  After serving as president of the SPC for ten years, Xiao 
Yang retired in March 2008.  Xiao possessed an extensive legal 
background in the procuracy, had previously served as Minister of 
Justice, and had been closely identified with efforts to 
professionalize the Chinese judiciary.  He was not replaced with a 
judge, lawyer, or someone with a professional legal background.  
Rather, central authorities elevated Wang Shengjun, a former 
provincial public security head who had risen to national 
prominence within Party political circles, to head China’s 
 
177 See, for example, the statements of Politburo member Jia Qinglin in 
Zhonggong zhongyang zhaokai zuotanhui tingqu dangwai renshi dui shenru sifa tizhi 
gaige de yijian [Central Committee Holds Forum to Listen to Non-Party Representatives 
Suggestions Regarding Judicial Reform], XINHUA, Nov. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200811/29/333020.shtml (noting that 
Chinese judicial reform will “strengthen the supervision of [official] power,” but 
that it will “unswervingly” “uphold Party leadership.”).  
178 Chris Buckley, China Milk Victim Lawyers Say Pressed to Quit, REUTERS, 
Sept. 28, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/naturalResources 
/idUSPEK28081820080929?sp=true. 
179 All China Lawyers Ass’n, Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers 
Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature, CONG.-EXEC COMM’N 
CHINA, Mar. 20, 2006, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad 
/index.phpd? showsingle=53258. 
180 Guangxi fayuan bu shouli 13 lei anjian sheng gaoyuan cheng you guoqing 
jueding [Guangxi Court Will Not Accept 13 Types of Cases, Provincial Court Says 
Decision Made Out of Consideration of National Condition], CHINA YOUTH DAILY, Aug. 
24 2004, available at http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/yjdt 
/20040824100627.htm. 
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judiciary.181  Mere months after Wang assumed office, Chinese 
courts found themselves in the throes of a new political 
campaign—the “Three Supremes”—emphasizing “the supremacy 
of Party work, the supremacy of popular interests, and the 
supremacy of the constitution and law.”182  While this language 
does include law as a guiding source for court work, comments by 
other officials suggest that the campaign is actually aimed at 
curbing excessive reliance by judges on law in deciding cases, 
particularly if doing so contributes to social unrest or conflict.  As 
one municipal court official noted in explaining the content of the 
“Three Supremes”: 
For a relatively long period of time, some units and 
individuals have been accustomed to simply emphasizing 
the supremacy of the constitution and the law . . . .  Simply 
handling cases, mechanically handling cases, handling 
cases in isolation, and generating petitions or causing 
[people] to be in confrontation with judges, these 
phenomena are not few in number.  Experience teaches us 
only emphasizing the constitution and the law is 
insufficient.  Each official carrying out the law must 
understand that strictly handling cases according to the law 
will only have significant autonomy and vitality when 
unified with Party work and the interests of the people.183 
In the summer of 2009, Beijing officials took further steps to 
curtail the activities of public interest lawyers:  they closed one of 
the most prominent domestic legal activist organizations, the Open 
Constitution Initiative (“OCI”), arrested one of its founders, Xu 
 
181 Zuigao renmin fayuan yuanzhang Wang Shengjun jianli [Curriculum 
Vitae of Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun], Mar. 16, 2008, 
available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-16/110915159271.shtml. 
182 Wang Shengjun: Fayuan gongzuo bixu jianchi ‘sangezhishang’ zhidao sixiang 
[Wang Shengjun: Court Work Must Uphold the Guiding Thought of the “Three 
Supremes”], XUEXI SHIBAO [STUDY TIMES], June 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/ldhd/2008-06/16/content_48466.htm.  See also 
Posting of Jerome Cohen to http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china 
_law_prof_blog/2008/10/jerome-cohen—1.html (Oct. 22, 2008). 
183 Wu Zhaoshun, Gaoyang zhengfa duiwu jianshe de zhuxuanlü [Raise Up the 
Theme of Constructing Political-Legal Ranks], CHINACOURT, May 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200805/29/304643.shtml. 
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Zhiyong, and disbarred other lawyers who had handled public 
interest cases.184 
It’s not entirely clear what these developments indicate.  The 
Chinese Communist Party and government are far from 
monolithic.  In the shifting factional mélange of modern Chinese 
politics, existing central attitudes may be simply nothing more 
than a temporary blip that will shift when prevailing political 
winds change.  Current resistance to the role of law may simply be 
the modern parallel to that faced by state-owned enterprise reform 
in 1990s—a transitory period in China’s long-term process of 
economic and social modernization.185 
On the other hand, it might not be.  Chinese legal reform might 
actually be encountering some fundamental limits.  Since 1989, 
Chinese authorities have adhered to one core political tenet:  that 
under no circumstances will they allow the supremacy of Party 
power to be called into question.  In the interest of maintaining this 
power, Chinese authorities intervened in the 1990s to curb 
experiments with local elections, aimed at providing better popular 
supervision of official power, when activists began to use elections 
to mount organized challenges to core principles of Party 
control.186  Chinese authorities moved in the early 2000s to clamp 
down on civil society organizations when these groups, initially 
tolerated as providing a forum for popular participation into the 
political system, began to stage high-profile challenges to central 
 
184 See Zhu Zhe & Cui Xiaohuo, Legal Aid Group Told to Pack Up, CHINA DAILY, 
July 18, 2009 (discussing Chinese authorities’ closure of OCI for improper 
registration, imposing a 1.4 million yuan [$200,000] fine for improperly receiving 
financial contributions).  See also Michael Wines, Public-Interest Lawyer is Held in 
China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at A6 (detailing the arrest of Xu Zhiyong on tax 
evasion charges). 
185 See Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song & Yang Yao, Impact and Significance of State-
Owned Enterprise Restructuring in China, 55 CHINA J. 35 (2006) (discussing the 
acceleration of privatization in China in the late 1990s after initial resistance).  But 
see The Second Long March, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 30–32 (noting that 
government support for privatization has declined, in part out of social stability 
concerns). 
186 See Kevin O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Accommodating “Democracy” in a One-
Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China, in ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN 
GREATER CHINA 101, 101–25 (Larry Diamond & Ramon H. Myers eds., 2001) 
(describing the evolution of village elections since 1980).  See also Linda Jakobsen, 
Local Governance: Village and Township Direct Elections, in GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
97, 108–10 (Jude Howell ed., 2004) (discussing Chinese authorities suppression of 
experiments with direct township elections). 
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development plans.187  Recent events suggest that Chinese officials 
may have drawn similar conclusions with regard to legal reform 
efforts. Officials seem to have decided that these reforms are 
creating a political space that is generating unacceptable challenges 
by activists and citizens to Party control of the system.  For Chinese 
leaders, this may represent a genie that must be stuffed back into 
the bottle at all costs—even at the cost of curtailing the underlying 
legal reforms aimed at resolving pervasive principal-agent 
problems at the heart of Chinese governance. 
This, of course, is but a partial solution.  Central Chinese 
officials still find themselves confronted with the need to come up 
with mechanisms to effectively control and monitor their local 
agents.  Central authorities do not want to see local officials 
abusing their official power to embezzle billions of dollars.  Nor do 
they want to see pervasive corruption facilitating food adulteration 
practices that sicken hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens.  
But if emphasizing the role of the judicial system in redressing 
grievances against officials risks turning them into a venue for 
politicized criticism of Party and state policies, and if establishing 
procedural norms for the exercise of local government power risks 
setting precedent that critics can turn against central government 
actions, what options do they have? 
One option is strengthening the use of responsibility systems.  
These top-down systems offer central authorities a tool (albeit an 
imperfect one) to force local officials to address particular issues of 
concern and monitor their compliance.  And importantly, since 
control of these systems rests in the hands of higher authorities 
rather than the citizenry at large, top-down responsibility systems 
do not pose the same risks to Party control that elections or legal 
channels do. 
Central Chinese authorities are indeed calling for stronger 
responsibility systems to address pressing problems facing China 
today.  Some Party documents contain positive calls for importing 
bottom-up monitoring principles into the cadre evaluation 
 
187 See CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT, 109th Cong., at 
81–83 (1st Sess. 2005) (detailing the development of the rule of law and the 
institutions of democratic governance in China); CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON 
CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT, 109th Cong., at 6 (2d Sess. 2006) (discussing regulatory 
controls on the development of civil society, and official creation of a government-
controlled “mass organization” to supervise Chinese environmental groups). 
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process.188  But others rely heavily on traditional measures of 
assigning strict and vicarious liability to individual Party and 
government leaders for a range of governance failures.  Central 
Party authorities have re-emphasized the need for the “core 
leader” (yibashou—generally, the party secretary) at each level of 
the official Chinese hierarchy to personally bear liability for 
maintaining social order.189  They also have called for 
strengthening responsibility systems applying strict liability 
principles for officials in political and legal organs.190  They have 
made Party “clean government” responsibility systems a key 
component of their 2008–2012 anti-corruption plan.191 
Provincial and local authorities have followed suit.  In the wake 
of numerous scandals and disasters, they have implemented 
responsibility systems tagging local Party secretaries with 
vicarious liability for incidents of citizen petitions or protest,192 
 
188 See, e.g., Zhonggong Jiangsu shengwei, Jiangsu sheng renmin zhengfu  
guanyu jianli cujin kexue fazhan de dangzheng lingdao banzi he lingdao ganbu 
kaohe pingjia jizhi de yijian [Jiangsu Provincial Party and Government Opinion 
on Creating Evaluation Mechanisms for Promoting Scientific Development 
Among Party and Government Leadership Groups and Cadres], issued July 14, 
2008 (P.R.C.). 
189 Zhonggong zhongyang ban’gongting zhuanfa “Zhongyang zhengfa 
weiyuanhui, zhongyang shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili weiyuanhui guanyu shenru 
kaizhan ping’an jianshe de yijian” de tongzhi, [General Office of the Central Party 
Committee Issues Notice on Distributing the ‘Opinion of the CCP Politics and 
Law Committee and Committee for the Comprehensive Management of Social 
Order on Further Deepening Peaceful Construction], issued Oct. 21, 2005 (P.R.C.), 
available at http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/zcfg/2005-10/21/content_1915.htm. 
190 See Zhongyang zhengfawei chutai yijian liu fangmian jiejue zhengfa gongzuo 
tuchu wenti [Central Political-Legal Committee Issues Opinion Resolving Six Pressing 
Problems With Political-Legal Work], LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 12, 2009, available at  
http://legaldaily.com.cn/2008fjdt/2009-02/12/content_1034299.htm (outlining 
the Central Political-Legal Committee opinion that calls, in part for perfecting 
social order responsibility systems and systematizing their use of “hard target” 
(yipiao foujue) principles). 
191 Jianli jianquan chengzhi he yufang fubai tixi 2008-2012 nian gongzuo guihua 
[2008-2012 Work Plan for Constructing and Perfecting a System for Punishing and 
Preventing Corruption], XINHUA, June 22, 2008, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-06/22/content_8417974.htm. 
192 See, e.g., Henan sheng wei zhengfu guanyu “ping’an henan jianshe 
gangyao” de tongzhi [Henan Provincial Party Committee and Government 
Circular Regarding the Issuance of the “Program for Construction of a Peaceful 
Henan”], issued Apr. 26, 2006, art 2(1) (P.R.C.), translated in 
http://sinolaw.typepad.com/chinese_law_and_politics_/2007/03/translation 
_hen.html. 
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mine explosions,193 food safety problems,194 unpaid migrant 
worker wages,195 and traffic accidents in their jurisdictions.196  
Scratch the surface of any social, legal, or political problem in 
China today, and you will find Party and government actors 
falling over themselves to enact or amend a responsibility system 
to address it. 
Nor are courts immune from these trends.  The Supreme 
People’s Court has required Chinese judges to bear individual 
responsibility for resolving complaints and petitions by citizens 
disgruntled as a result of their decisions.197  Pursuant to a 2005 
central campaign aimed at addressing judicial enforcement 
problems, Chinese authorities ordered the incorporation of court 
enforcement statistics in relevant local social order responsibility 
systems.  These systems apply career sanctions based on vicarious 
and strict liability for officials whose actions in enforcing judicial 
verdicts result in citizen protests or other “mass incidents.”198 
 
193 Tuixing dangzheng yibashou chengnuozhi chu shigu dangwei zerenren 
[Promoting the Assurance System for Core Leaders in the Party and Government, 
Responsibile Members of the Party Committee Will Bear Responsibility for 
Accidents], YANTIAN QU ANQUAN SHENGCHAN JIANDU GUANLIJU [YANTIAN DISTRICT 
WORK SAFETY BUREAU WEBSITE], Aug. 10, 2005, 
http://www.ytsafety.gov.cn/viewnews.jsp?newsID=6758. 
194 Zhoufeng xian shipin anquan zeren zhi [Zhoufeng County Food Product 
Safety Responsibility System (Experimental)], issued Nov. 23, 2006 (P.R.C.), 
available at http://www.slfs.gov.cn/Jgbm/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=152. 
195 Guanyu zhiding youguan gongzuo zhidu qieshi jiejue jianshe lingyu 
tuoqian gongcheng kuan he nongmingong gongzi wenti de tongzhi [Notice 
Regarding Establishing Work Systems Related to Practically Resolving the 
Problem of Unpaid Loans and Migrant Worker Back Wages in the Construction 
Sector], Qiandongnan PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT WEBSITE, Nov. 25, 2006, 
http://new.qdn.gov.cn/cms/cms/website/qdnzf/jsp/page.jsp?channelId=150 
&infoId=7239. 
196 Guanyu jin yibu jiaqiang daolu jiaotong anquan gongzuo de jinji tongzhi 
[Emergency Notice Regarding Further Strengthening Road Transportation Safety 
Work], ANYUAN COUNTY WEBSITE, Sept. 4, 2008, art. 3, http://xxgk.ay.gov.cn 
/bmgkxx/ajj/gzdt/zwdt/200809/t20080927_5117.htm. 
197 Zhang Na, Zhu Yunfeng, Fan Jie, Renmin fayuan tuixing faguan panhou dayi 
zhidu [People’s Courts to Promote System of Judges Responding to Post-Decision 
Questions and Complaints], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY], Nov. 3, 
2005, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=183759. 
198 For the full text of the relevant national directive, see Zhongyang zhengfa 
wei guanyu qieshi jiejue renmin fayuan zhixing nan wenti [Central Political-Legal 
Committee’s Notice on Solving Enforcement Problems of Chinese Courts], issued 
2005 (P.R.C.), available at http://wenda.tianya.cn/wenda/thread?Tid 
=4d7dd29b54aa5aa6.  For the relevant provincial documents issued jointly by the 
Shaanxi High People’s Court and the Shaanxi provincial branch of the Committee 
for the Comprehensive Management of Public Security, see Guanyu jiang renmin 
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Confronted with aggressive citizen use of legal institutions to 
demand faster and deeper reform, Chinese central authorities may 
be turning away from (or at least temporarily toning down) their 
decades-long experiment with legal reform.  They may have 
decided that the risks associated with creating institutional bottom-
up mechanisms for citizen legal and political participation are too 
great.  For the near future, Chinese authorities may be bent on 
strengthening top-down responsibility systems based on strict, 
vicarious, and collective liability as a key tool to manage and direct 
the Chinese state. 
But this has real and serious costs.  Extensive use of strict, 
vicarious, and collective liability linked to responsibility targets as 
a means to monitor local officials itself contributes to the riots, 
cover-ups, and governance failures that central authorities seek to 
avoid.  Chinese leaders may find that their preferred short-term 
monitoring strategy is actually undermining their own core long-
term interest—the stability of their country. 
 
 
fayuan zhixing gongzuo naru shehui zhi’an zonghezhili mubiao kaohe fanwei de 
yijian [Opinion Regarding Incorporating Court Enforcement Work into the Scope 
of Targets for the Comprehensive Management of Public Security], SHAANXI 
DAILY, July 14, 2007, available at http://news.shaanxi.gov.cn 
/shownews.asp?id=65512; Quansheng fayuan zhixing gongzuo naru shehui 
zhi’an zonghe zhili mubiao zeren kaohe xize [Evaluation Details for Incorporating 
Court Enforcement Work Within Responsibility Systems for the Comprehensive 
Management of Public Security], issued July 9, 2007 (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.sxdaily.com.cn/data/flfg/20070709_9887232_2.htm.  Note that these 
systems also apply sanctions in situations where local authorities fail to support 
judicial authorities who encounter violent resistance in enforcing verdicts, or 
where mass protests result from local government failures to cooperate with or 
carry out judicial verdicts.  This may represent a potential tool by which judicial 
authorities can draw upon the power of potential career sanctions to obtain 
compliance of other government officials. 
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